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GOLDEN RULE REASONING,
MORAL JUDGMENT, AND LAW
Neil Duxbury*
This article examines "Golden Rule reasoning"--reasoningaccording to
the principle that we should treat others as we would have them treat us-as a
basis for moral action and as a criterion for assessing the moral quality and
implications of judicial decisions, legal rules, and proposalsfor legal reform.
After distinguishing the Golden Rule from other ideas and principles with
which it is sometimes associated,I embark upon a defense of the Golden Rule as
a principle offairness. The main approach to defending this principle has been
to detach Golden Rule-based behaviorfrom the desires of agents and recipients.
The purpose of adopting this approach is to avoid reducing the Golden Rule to
the proposition that we are entitled to impose on others preferences that we
would happily have imposed on us. I examine various attempts to show that
the Golden Rule requires that agents do not simply project their values and
desires onto others and I argue that the most successful of these is R.M. Hare's
explanation of Golden Rule reasoning in universal prescriptivist terms.
Although the universal prescriptivist explanation is open to various criticisms-as becomes obvious when it is applied to particularmoralproblems such
as euthanasia and abortion-it nevertheless provides a strong philosophical
basisfor claiming not only that Golden Rule reasoningneed not be connected to
particulartastes and preferences but also that, as a matter of moral principle,
we should never tolerate double standards where cases are relevantly similar.
While I accept and try to demonstrate the merits of interpretingthe Golden Rule
in universal prescriptivist terms, however, I conclude that a more robust interpretation of the Rule is one which is advanced by some natural law philosophers and which offers a philosophicaljustification for the proposition that
doing to others as one would have done to oneself is necessarily a case of doing
good towards others. The article ends with some reflections on the implications
© 2009 Neil Duxbury. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, Law Department, London School of Economics and Political
Science.
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of this version of Golden Rule reasoningfor legal policymaking, and in particularfor the abortion debate.
INTRODUCTION

Sometimes, we try to transmit wisdom by formulating simple
"rules" which we think others will do well to heed. These rules we
occasionally refer to as "golden," to emphasize that if we start with
these rules and abide by them in some particular activity, what we
desire should be attained and what we do not desire avoided. Books
abound offering "golden rules" of self-improvement-how to thrive at
myriad tasks, pastimes, projects, and so on-and at one time or
another most of us will either give or receive golden rule advice. My
own favorite examples, qua recipient, are supposed golden rules of
wallpaper-hanging (less paste, more speed) and freestyle swimming
(choose the path of most resistance).
Such examples typify golden rules: they are efforts to provide
general guidance, efforts which are often lacking in subtlety and easily
contradicted, rules only insofar as they are rules of thumb. Whether
formulating or being told of golden rules, we usually recognize them,
or are foolish if we do not recognize them, for what they are: pieces of
advice which, though very likely memorable and possibly valuable, are
not indispensable or capable of taking the place of endeavor and
engagement. To apply this characterization to the golden rule most
familiar to lawyers would be somewhat uncharitable. That ordinary
words in statutes should be given their ordinary meanings (and technical words their technical meanings) unless absurdity would result is
not described as a "golden rule" for nothing: if it were unreasonable
to presume that courts will take words to have the meanings attributed
to them in normal usage, it would be impossible for lawyers and
others confidently to advise and act on the statutes that concern them.
Yet, as every lawyer knows, this golden rule is not the only legitimate
criterion for interpreting statutes and, in any event, where serious
doubt as to the appropriate construction of a statute exists, courts are
in effect making a judgment rather than determining which rule, or
combination of rules, does the legislation the most justice.1 Law's
golden rule, like other purported golden rules, has value; that a rule's
value makes its designation as "golden" comprehensible, however,
1 Metro. Props. Co. v. Purdy, (1940) 1 All E.R. 188, 191 (A.C.) ("Under the
Courts (Emergency Powers) Act 1939, the court, be it the master or the judge, is really
put very much in the position of a Cadi under the palm tree. There are no principles
on which he is directed to act. He has to do the best he can in the circumstances,
having no rules of law to guide him . .

").
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does not mean that the designation must be accurate. Golden rules
are invariably fakes.
But there is one Golden Rule, complete with capital letters, which
is commonly considered the genuine article. This is the prescription-sometimes phrased as a proscription-to do unto others as we
would have them do unto us. Just when this stipulation was first
described as a Golden Rule is unclear, 2 though references to the basic
moral sentiment can be traced back long before Christianity.3 It is
perhaps rash to claim that the Rule is "[t]he only standard of duty
common to all people."'4 But it is certainly recognized in all cultures,
and numerous studies show that it has been endorsed in all of the
major and most minor religions. 5 Although there will be reason in
this study to refer occasionally to particular religious formulations of
the Golden Rule, there is no need (and anyway I lack the competence) to examine it as a feature of different traditions and faiths.
Nor is there much to be gained from simply identifying instances
where the Rule features in law. Dig deep enough, and such instances
can certainly be found. Courts have appealed to the Golden Rule,
among other things, as a benchmark of good advocacy and legal probity, 6 a principle of judicial (and interjurisdictional) as comity, 7 a
means of determining whether a claimant deserves an equitable rem2

Edward Gibbon's casual use of the designation in 10 EDWARD GIBBONS, THE
23 n.43 (J.B. Bury ed., F. de Fau & Co. 1907)
(1776)-"Calvin violated the golden rule of doing as he would be done by"-suggests
that it was in common use by the mid-eighteenth century. The earliest example I
know of its use in English is in BENJAMIN CAMFIELD, A PROFITABLE ENQUIRY INTO THAT
COMPREHENSIVE RULE OF RIGHTEOUSNESS 212-13 (1679). Philippidis shows that in
Germany the equivalent "Goledene Regel" was in use by the end of the sixteenth
century. LEONIDASJOH. PHILIPPIDIS, DIE "GOLDENE REGEL" 11-15 (1933). John Mayo
observed that the principle was one of the "golden decrees" of twelfth-century ecclesiastical law. John Mayo, Sermon at the Assises in Dorchester (July 23, 1629), in THE
UNI'VERSAL PRINCIPLE (London, John Smithwike 1630).
3 SeeJ.O. Hertzler, On Golden Rules, 44 INT'LJ. ETHICS 418, 419-23 (1934).
4 JOHN BIGELOW, TOLERATION AND OTHER ESSAYS AND STUDIES 72 (1927).
5 The most detailed of these studies are PHILIPPIDIS, supra note 2; H.T.D. ROST,
THE GOLDEN RULE 15 (1986); and JEFFREY WATrLES, THE GOLDEN RULE 15-67 (1996).
6 See, e.g., Acushnet Co. v. Birdie Golf Ball Co., 166 F.R.D. 42, 43 (S.D. Fla. 1996);
Williams v. Lane, 96 F.R.D. 383, 388 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Barnard v. Yates, 10 S.C.L. (1
Nott. & McC.) 142, 145 (S.C. Const. Ct. 1818); see alsoJohn Finnis, Commensuration
and Public Reason, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON
215, 229-30 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997) ("Judges . . . have (relatively determinate)
authority not only to find, declare, and enforce the existing rules but also (relatively
indeterminate) authority to reshape them and/or make new rules. . . . So there
emerge the two dimensions on which to compare and evaluate the rival interpretations of a particular part of the law in dispute between the parties before a court: the
dimension of fit with the legal materials and the dimension of moral soundness.").
DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE
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edy,8 as a rationale for limiting certain forms of speech and expression, 9 for the judicial review of legislative action,' 0 and as the basis for
principles of equitable fair dealing,"1 restitution for unjust enrichment, 12 general trusteeship,1 3 proprietary estoppel, 14 specific performance (compelling the defendant to do to the claimant as he
would have had the claimant do to him had their positions been
reversed), 15 and the duty of care in negligence. 1 6 Various writers have
7 See, e.g., Lord v. Cannon, 75 Ga. 300, 306 (1885) ("Some comity is doubtless
due to the decisions of other courts, and some presumptions must be made in favor
of their correctness. We should dislike to have any other rule applied to the jurisdiction of our own courts, and should feel bound to resist encroachments upon it, come
from what quarter they might, and, therefore, we should be careful to do unto others
what we would have them to do unto us."); In re Westinghouse, [1978] A.C. 547, 560
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) ("Such is the request made by the United States
Federal Court. It is our duty and our pleasure to do all we can to assist that court just
as we would expect the United States court to help us in like circumstances. 'Do unto
others as you would be done by."').
8 See, e.g., City of Tampa v. Colgan, 149 So. 587, 589 (Fla. 1933) ("[In equity the
defendant must do unto others even as he would have others do unto him, and it is
no more equitable that he should escape the entire burden than it is that he should
be made to bear more than his proportion of the burden. When one prays relief in
equity, whether as complainant or defendant, he must do as well as demand equity.").
9 See, e.g.,
Murphyv. Zoning Comm'n, 148 F. Supp. 2d 173, 191 (D. Conn. 2001).
10 See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Hodde v. Superior Court, 244 P.2d 668, 672 (Wash. 1952);
see also Mosqueda v. Cheyenne-Arapaho Election Bd., 5 Okla. Trib. 12, 15 (CheyenneArap. D. Ct. 1996) ("Civil rights are limitations on government action, designed to
compel governments (federal, state or tribal) to adhere to the Golden Rule: Do unto
others as you would have them do unto you.").
11 See, e.g., Urie v. Johnston, 3 Pen. & W. 212, 218 (Pa. 1831).
12 See, e.g.,
Smith v. Mitchell, 6 Ga. 458, 478-79 (1849); Minter v. Dent, 37 S.C.L.
(3 Rich.) 205, 212 (1832); see also Sumter Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Winn, 23 S.E. 29, 30
(S.C. 1895) (Pope, J., dissenting) ("[Defendant in equity] should be required to do
unto others as he now claims this association should do to him .... ); cf. Cook &
Nichol, Inc. v. Plimsoll Club, 451 F.2d 505, 509 n.12 (5th Cir. 1971) (citing the statutory principle of equity which is rooted in both the Golden Rule and principles of
unjust enrichment).
13 See, e.g., Finley v. Exch. Trust Co., 80 P.2d 296, 303 (Okla. 1938).
14 See, e.g., Sugg v. N.C. Agric. Credit Corp., 144 S.E. 554, 555 (N.C. 1928);
Kunick v. Trout, 85 N.W.2d 438, 448 n.19 (N.D. 1957).
15 See, e.g., Mack v. Shafer, 67 P. 40, 41 (Cal. 1901).
16 See, e.g., Cent. of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Steverson, 57 So. 494, 495 (Ala. Ct. App. 1911);
Kindt v. Kauffman, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603, 619 (Ct. App. 1976); Hornthal v. Norfolk S.
R.R. Co., 82 S.E. 830, 831 (N.C. 1914); see also Hunter v. Ward, 476 F. Supp. 913, 918
n.3 (E.D. Ark. 1979) (utilizing the Golden Rule to dismiss arguments that a potential
employer's failure to help a candidate meet lunch appointments amounted to
employment discrimination); CHESAPEAKE & 0. Ry. Co. v. PARIs' ADM'R, 68 S.E. 398,
401 (Va. 1910) ("[Ilt is the duty of the party injured by reasonable care to diminish
the consequences of the wrong he has suffered, in the interest of the wrongdoer.
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argued that the Rule provides a rationale not only for laws of armed
conflict (such as those concerning the treatment of prisoners of war)
and for nations respecting mutual treaty agreements and one
another's rights to independence, but also for humanitarian intervention and other forms of rescue. 17 Some judges have likened the Rule
to an equitable principle,1 8 and for a while it was a key part of the
definition of contractual good faith in the Louisiana Civil Code.' 9
But the significance of these manifestations of the Golden Rule in
law is easily overestimated. Few of the arguments add up to very
much, which may be why we find hardly any of them advanced in
superior courts or by eminent judges. Perhaps the most obvious
deduction to be made from these various pronouncements is that,
with a little imagination, most legal rules and doctrines can be connected to the Golden Rule. The main study to date of the Golden
Rule as a legal principle hardly considers instances where the Rule has
explicitly been adopted as such; rather, it follows in the path of many
other analyses of the Rule and examines it primarily as a principle of
moral action. 20 This makes perfect sense, because the significance of
This is not merely good law but good morals, and flows from that rule which has the
highest possible sanction, that we should do unto others as we would have others do
unto us."); cf Trianon Park Condo. Ass'n v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912, 927 (Fla.
1985) (Shaw, J., dissenting) ("Violation of the general duty to do unto others as you
would have them do unto you, without more, is not actionable negligence .... "). For
a note on the Hand formula in U.S. negligence law as a variant on the Golden Rule,
see Samson Vermont, The Golden Hand Formula, 11 GREEN BAG 2d 203, 204-05 (2008).
17 See EIK H. ERIKSON, INSIGHT and RESPONSIBILITY 242 (1964); 2 GERMAIN
GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS: LIVING A CHRISTIAN LIFE 869, 898, 909 (1993);
Ernest D. Burton, Is the Golden Rule Workable Between Nations?, 51 BIBLICAL WORLD 131,
136-37 (1918); John Finnis, Natural Law and the Re-making of Boundaries, in STATES,
NATIONS, AND BORDERS 171, 176 (Allen Buchanan & Margaret Moore eds., 2003).
18 See, e.g., In re Curtis, 30 A. 769, 770 (Conn. 1894); Troll v. City of St. Louis, 168
S.W. 167, 176 (Mo. 1914). But cf Williams v. Concord Congregational Church, 44 A.
272, 274 (Pa. 1899) (observing equity and the Golden Rule as distinct doctrines leading to the same conclusion).
19 See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1965 (1977) ("The equity intended by this rule is
founded in the Christian principle not to do unto others that which we would not
wish others should do unto us."); see also Nat'l Safe Corp. v. Benedict & Myrick, Inc.,
371 So. 2d 792, 795 (La. 1979) (explaining that under the Louisiana Code the type of
equity intended is defined by the Golden Rule). In 1987, the Louisiana legislature
dropped the reference to the Golden Rule. See Am. Bank & Trust of Coushatta v.
FDIC, 49 F.3d 1064, 1067 (5th Cir. 1995).
20 See Ganter Spendel, Die Goldene Regel als Rechtsprinzip, in FESTSCHRnF-r FUR FRITZ
VON HIPPEL 491, 491-516 (Joseph Esser & Hans Thieme eds., 1967). Insofar as
Spendel does examine the Golden Rule as a "valid legal principle," he argues primarily that it is the negative version of the Rule-which he identifies with the German
folk-proverb: "Was du nicht willst daB man dir tu', das fig auch keinem andern zu"

1534

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 84:4

Golden Rule reasoning to law rests not so much in how the Rule has
been used, but in some of the conclusions lawyers and judges would
have to contend with were they to take the Rule seriously as a moral
principle providing reasons for action.
After offering some preliminary remarks about and setting aside
some potential misinterpretations of the Golden Rule, I shall show
how moral and political philosophers have recognized that basic formulations of it need to be qualified or elaborated if those formulations are to make moral sense. Although different philosophers
provide different qualifications and elaborations, and although their
various attempts at refinement are inevitably subject to criticisms,
some of the resulting arguments in support of the Golden Rule as a
moral principle are remarkably robust. Only when we have considered these arguments will it make any sense to consider some legal
implications of Golden Rule reasoning. What we will discover-this is
no doubt predictable-is that positions taken in law and positions supported by Golden Rule reasoning sometimes oppose one another. We
would expect, in such instances, that if the Golden Rule is rationally
defensible, then the legal positions which it opposes are unsupportable. To reach this conclusion would, I think, be simplistic. The fact
that Golden Rule reasoning demonstrates certain actions to be morally objectionable or unobjectionable is not in itself a sufficient reason
for criminalizing or legalizing those actions. In due course we will see,
for example, that such reasoning has been employed in an effort to
demonstrate that euthanasia is sometimes morally permissible. But
even if Golden Rule reasoning does demonstrate as much, it does not
(translated as, "What you don't want others to do to you, that to others you should not
do")-that has especial legal significance, because it provides the rationale for legal
prohibitions, and particularly for the criminal law. Id. at 492. The argument is
echoed in modern Confucian scholarship, where it is sometimes claimed that Confucius deliberately formulated the Golden Rule negatively so as to discourage harmful
behavior. See, e.g., Robert E. Allinson, The Confucian Golden Rule: A Negative Formulation, 12J. CHINESE PHIL. 305, 305-11 (1985). There is certainly no reason to believe
that positive formulations of the Golden Rule are somehow morally superior to negative ones. See George Brockwell King, The "Negative" Golden Rule, 8 J. RELIGION 268,
275-79 (1928). But equally, there is no reason to accept that the negative version is
more relevant to law than the positive version. Negative Golden Rule injunctions
seem generally less susceptible to being turned into absurdities than do positive ones
and may be more relevant to various types of conciliatory initiatives (such as the drafting of interstate peace agreements) than are positive ones. Nonetheless, positive
injunctions, such as that one should respect property or that one should tell the truth
(just as one would expect the same from others), are no less reasons for legal rules
than are negative injunctions, such as that one should not steal or tell lies (just as one
would not want to have one's property stolen or be told lies).
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necessarily follow that euthanasia should be legalized, for there may
be prudential reasons against legalization-fears, for example, about
how decriminalizing the practice might increase the likelihood of
abuse or mistakes, or how it might alter our principles concerning
how to treat the aged and the seriously ill. 2 1 My argument is not that
the Golden Rule is an unassailable moral principle which the law
ought always to follow-a law which we cannot defend by Golden Rule
reasoning is not necessarily something that ought not to be law-but
that, appropriately interpreted, the Rule provides us with a standard
according to which we might usefully test our intuitions regarding the
moral quality and implications of particular legal principles and
initiatives.
I.

THE GOLDEN RULE: SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

The Golden Rule is a routine principle of action. There are occasions when, wishing to do the right thing but being unsure of the right
thing to do, we might usefully ask what we would think of our contemplated action if someone else were to act in the same way toward us.
In such instances the Golden Rule usefully serves as an interruptive
tactic, like counting to ten to avoid losing our temper, or as a way of
checking our standards (just as sometimes, we might, before acting,
ask ourselves how we think somebody whose temperament and judgment we admire and respect would act in the same situation). But
most of the time the Golden Rule is practiced unreflectively-the
spontaneity of so much social action makes this inevitable-and when
we speak of it, it is because we think it has been breached. When we
do reflect on the Golden Rule, it becomes clear very quickly that it can
22
be formulated, and therefore understood, in many different ways.
The interpretive difficulties surrounding the Rule are evident even if
we stick with our formulation of it as "do unto others as we would have
them do unto us." Does "do unto" mean "do good unto"? Does
"others" mean all others? (And what are "others"?) Are we doing
unto others as they would do unto us if we were them, or if we were us in
their shoes? These difficulties will have to be addressed.
21

See PHILIPPA

FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY

44 (2002).
22 One philosopher tried to show in his doctoral dissertation that there are "4608
...correct forms of the golden rule." HarryJ. Gensler, The Golden Rule 83 (Sept.
1977) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, on file with author).
Nearly two decades later he revised this figure, concluding that there are 6480 good
forms of the Rule (as contrasted with a significantly higher number of "bad forms...
having absurd implications"). HARRvJ. GENSLER, FoRmAL ETHICS 104 (1996).
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Before tackling these difficulties, however, we should address a
more basic problem. Those who analyze the Golden Rule now and
again try to explain the concept by showing it to be an instance of
some other phenomenon. Sometimes these efforts are patently
unconvincing. The interest of American sociologists in the Golden
Rule, J.O. Hertzler observed in the mid-1930s, "rest[ed] primarily
upon its efficacy as an agent in social control, and upon the sociological and social psychological principles involved in its operation." 23 He
may well have been right: theories of social control (as anyone familiar with the history of sociological jurisprudence and legal realism in
the United States knows) were all the rage around this time, and
exceptional would have been those mechanisms, institutions, systems,
conventions, and the like which were not, somewhere in the already
vast and fast-growing social-scientific literature, described as instruments of social control. 24 If any of Hertzler's contemporaries were
inclined to describe the Golden Rule thus, however, they would have
been making a mistake. For while choosing to follow the Golden Rule
may require self-discipline-making a conscious effort to be concerned for others-the Rule itself exerts no social control whatsoever;
indeed, as Hertzler remarks, it "operates from within the individual,
25
and results in the voluntary limitation of behavior."
The argument that the Golden Rule is an agent of social control
concerns not what the Rule is, but how it functions in social contexts.
But how the Rule functions in social contexts depends upon how the
agents using the Rule interpret it, and so efforts to explain it by reference to usage turn out to be inconclusive. A survey of a class of sixthgraders in an American public school revealed that most thought it
would "probably" be easier consistently to follow a negatively formulated Golden Rule as opposed to a positively formulated one. 26 Some

thought that "others" in the proposition "do not do unto others what
you would not want them to do unto you" does not include enemies.
Some thought that it does include animals. 2 7 There are strong rea23

Hertzler, supra note 3, at 427.

24 See generally DOROTHY Ross,

THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE

219-56,

303-89 (1991) (describing the emergence of a social control sociology in American
social science).
25 Hertzler, supra note 3, at 428. However, later in the article he appears to contradict this position: "IT]he positive statement [of the Golden Rule] . . . develops
socialized attitudes and behavior patterns ....

The negative statement leads to a

functional equilibrium and maintains existing social control." Id. at 432.
26 See Ron B. Rembert, The Golden Rule: Two Versions and Two Views, 12 J. MORAL
EDuc. 100, 101 (1983).

27

See id. at 100-02.
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sons, we will see, for concluding that others must include enemies and
cannot include animals. But these reasons are beside the point, which
is that seeking opinions about how to follow the Golden Rule reveals
only that the Rule means different things to different people. Some
argue that living by the Golden Rule is inconsistent with economic
competition because practitioners of the Rule who want to outwit
their business competitors cannot equally want their business competitors to outwit them. 28 Others argue that following the Golden Rule is
perfectly consistent with economic competition because by so doing
one fosters good relations both inside and outside one's business,
thereby increasing the likelihood of ensuring customer and employee
loyalty and long-term profitability. 29 These and other differences of
opinion over the Golden Rule are interesting, but, beyond telling us
that the Rule is subject to various interpretations, they do not help us
to make sense of it as a moral principle.
30
The Golden Rule is often described as a principle of reciprocity.
Not all behavior motivated by the Golden Rule need entail the ethic
of reciprocity. Conserving resources for future generations is an
instance of treating others as we would have them treat us, notwith28 See, e.g., Douglas Firth Anderson, Presbyteriansand the Golden Rule: The Christian
Socialism of JE. Scott, 67 Am. PRESBYTERIANS 231, 234 (1989); Bruno Brlisauer, Die
Goldene Regel; Analyse einer dem Kategorischen Imperativ verwandten Grundnorm, 71 KANTSTUDIEN 325, 331 (1980) (arguing that the Golden Rule is hostile to competition
[ wettbewerbsfeindlichen]); Alice S. Cary, Economic Freedom and the Golden Rule, 13 CHRISTIANiFY & CRISIS 84, 84-86 (1953). The argument is wrongheaded: the correct deduction from the Golden Rule is not that because I like winning I must let my economic
adversaries win, but that I will compete against them just as I would have them compete against me.

29 See, e.g., ARTHUR NASH, THE GOLDEN RULE IN BUSINESS 71-81, 138-60 (2d ed.
1930); J.C. PENNEY, FIFr'Y YEARS WITH THE GOLDEN RULE (1950); Leo L. Clarke et al.,
The PracticalSoul of Business Ethics: The CorporateManager's Dilemma and the Social Teaching of the Catholic Church, 29 SEATLE U. L. REv. 139, 164 (2005) ("There are few moral
principles more fundamental to American notions of fair play than the Golden Rule:
'Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.' Application of this rule ... to
typical business situations may readily lead to behavioral decisions impinging on longterm profit-maximization. Many managers in the 1950s and 1960s, for example,
would not have considered internalizing the cost of water or air pollution because to
do so would have lowered profits. If, however, they had followed the Golden Rule in
their relations with downstream and downwind neighbors, they would have reduced
pollution or compensated those neighbors despite the fact that compensation was not
legally required."); William N. Evans & loannis N. Kessides, Living by the "Golden Rule":
Multimarket Contact in the US. Airline Industry, 109 Q.J. ECON. 341, 365 (1994) (claiming that airlines that follow the Golden Rule reduce the likelihood of their competitors engaging in aggressive pricing action); Wilfred Currier Keirstead, The Golden Rule

in Business, 3J. RELIGION 141, 152-53 (1923).
30 See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MOtLITv

OF LAw

20 (rev. ed. 1969).
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standing that it might be impossible for those others to act reciprocally (though they may follow our example). It is certainly correct,
however, to say that such behavior can usually be explained in terms
of reciprocity.
Yet not all behavior motivated by reciprocity will be explicable in
terms of, or consistent with, the Golden Rule. "Treat others as you
would have them treat you" is a different proposition from "treat
others well so that you might expect the same in return"-even
though a side-effect of treating others as we would have them treat us
may be that they treat us as (favorably as) we treated them in the event
that our roles are reversed. By acting according to the Golden Rule
we will sometimes achieve the same ends as when we agree to repay
favors or engage in other forms of strategically reciprocal action. But
treating others as you would have them treat you is primarily moral
rather than strategic action, a choice to do what seems right rather
than what is likely to prove profitable; indeed, by following the
Golden Rule we will sometimes act against the interests of others who
would repay our support because, were the tables turned, we would
want to be treated with the same integrity.
Other efforts to explain the Golden Rule by associating it with
particular concepts need to be treated with similar caution. Although
resolving to follow the Golden Rule can create obligations to assist
others, not all Golden Rule based behavior can be equated with Good
Samaritanism, because our treatment of others in accordance with
how we would have them treat us often has nothing to do with the
question whether those others are in some way in need or distress.
Much of our treatment of others-the courtesies we extend, the
pleasantries we use, much of the advice we give-is based on how we
would have others treat us irrespective of whether they need, or
whether we think they need, this treatment. Action motivated by the
Golden Rule need not be charitable, for if our resolve is to treat
others with the honesty that we would have them show toward us, then
our honest opinion might be that others are seeking help unnecessarily, or are seeking more help than they need and that, were we in
their position, we would not consider ourselves deserving of their
charity. Following the Golden Rule does not compel altruistic behavior, for in fair competition we consider it reasonable that others do
not look out for us or take care of our interests. Nor is it correct to
equate the Golden Rule with the principle that one should love one's
neighbor as oneself. The proposition that I should care for others as I
would care for myself is distinguishable from the proposition that I
should care for others as I would have them care for me. The two
principles are very closely connected and it would be an inadequate
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examination of the Golden Rule that did not take account of this connection. But while it is difficult to envisage instances in which, by following the Golden Rule, we do not uphold the neighbor-as-oneself
principle as well, it should be kept in mind from the outset that these
two principles are distinct.
Albrecht Dihle has argued-unconvincingly-that this distinction is especially evident if we test each principle against the claim that
one should love one's enemies. According to Dihle, the Golden Rule
is a species of "repayment thinking" (Vergeltungsdenken) that evolved
out of the principle of lex talionis-thatany action, good or bad, necessarily calls forth an equivalent reaction-as formulated and practiced in ancient Mediterranean cultures. 31 The two principles
certainly need not be inconsistent. Soldiers might justify retaliation
against the military actions of their opponents for the reason that they
would expect from their opponents nothing different. But Dihle
argues that it is impossible to incorporate the requirement that one
love one's enemy into the Golden Rule without contradicting the
principle of lex talionis. The requirement can be incorporated into
the neighbor principle, however, by extending the definition of
neighbor-as it is extended in, for example, the parable of the Good
Samaritan 3 2-beyond the immediate community to humanity in general (the defense of which will sometimes require retaliatory action) .3
Dihle's effort to distinguish the neighbor principle from the
Golden Rule is unconvincing because it requires that one accept his
basic thesis: that the Golden Rule is connected to lex talionis. The
historical soundness of that thesis has been widely disputed 3 4 and it is
obvious that the two concepts are analytically distinct. Dihle himself
notes some distinctions, such as that following the Golden Rule
involves taking account of the perspectives of at least two parties
whereas lex talionisis purely agent-centered, and that Golden Rule reasoning takes place before rather than after the fact.3 5 But the distinc-

tions go deeper than Dihle concedes-so deep, in fact, that it is
difficult to see how treating the Golden Rule and lex talionis as related
concepts helps us to understand either. "Hit him back as he hit you"
31

See ALBRECHT

DIHLE, DIE GOLDENE REGEL 80-127

(1962).

32 See Luke 10:30-37 (New English Bible).
33 See DIHLE, supra note 31, at 109-27.
34 See, e.g., VICTOR PAUL FURNISH, THE LoVE COMMAND IN THE NEW TESTAMENT
57 n.10 7 (1972); Peder Borgen, Den skalteoldne regel (Matt. 7:12, Luk. 6:31), 9 NORSK
TEOLOGISK TIDSSKRIFT 129, 141-42 (1966); Adolf Lutz, Die Goldene Regel, 18 ZEITSCHRIFr FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG 467 (1964); James M. Robinson, Book
Review, 4 J. Hisr. PHIL. 84, 86-87 (1966) (reviewing DIHLE, supra note 31).
35 See DIHLE, supra note 31, at 80-82.
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might sound like the Golden Rule-developmental psychologists have
claimed that in early-stage moral development, children often mistake
it for such 6-but hitting back as he hit you is responsive behavior,
whereas treating others not as they treated you but as you would have
them treat you is reflective and nonretaliatory. Indeed, behavior motivated by the Golden Rule might be considered opposed to lex talionis.
you should not strike him because you would not have him strike
you.

37

Perhaps Dihle's principal error is to think of the relationship
between those who act and those who are treated according to the
Golden Rule as equivalent or symmetrical. According to Paul
Ricoeur, between agent and recipient there will, from the outset, be
an imbalance of power, which Golden Rule-motivated action might
or might not even out. 38 Ricoeur's own depiction of this relationship

is dramatic. Other-directed action involving "disesteem" makes the
other into a "victim" or "patient" of his or her action.39 In such "dissymmetric situation[s]," the Golden Rule stands as a corrective, for it
"establishes the other in the position of someone to whom an obligation is owed, someone who is counting on me and making self-constancy a response to this expectation." 40 But how does the Golden
Rule counter disesteem? Why should I act according to the Rule,
thereby considering myself obliged in the way that Ricoeur describes,
if the recipient of my action is my enemy?
Ricoeur offers three answers. First, Golden Rule reasoning
entails "reversibility of the roles,' ' 4 1 and so agents who imagine them-

selves as their recipients might discover a capacity for solicitude that
would in all probability have eluded them had the effort to imagine
oneself as another not been made. 42 There are two objections to this
answer. The first is the obvious point that reversibility cuts both ways:
if I say to my son that were he to imagine himself as the sunbathers on
36 See, e.g.,
JEAN PIAGET, The MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 322-24 (Marjorie
Gabain trans., Free Press 1965) (1948); T.J. Bachmeyer, The Golden Rule and Developing
MoralJudgment, 68 RELIGIOUS EDUC. 348, 348-49 (1973); Lawrence Kohlberg, Justiceas
Reversibility, in 5 PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 257, 265 (Peter Laslett &James
Fishkin eds., 1979).
37 See Werner Wolbert, Die Goldene Regel und das ius talionis, 95 TRIERER THEOLOGISCHE ZEITSCHRJFr 169 (1986), for a general exploration of the differences
between the concepts.

38 See

PAUL RICOEUR, ONESELF AS ANOTHER

Chicago Press 1992) (1990).
39 See id. at 320.
40 Id. at 268.
41 Id. at 330.
42 See id. at 191-92.

223 (Kathleen Blarney trans., Univ.
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the beach at whom he keeps shooting his water-pistol then he would
know not to do it, he might reply that were the sunbathers to imagine
themselves as him then they would know the opportunity really is too

44
good to resist.43 If we rein in reversibility, as Kurt Baier does, limit-

ing it to the proposition that it is wrong to do to others those things
which it would be contrary to reason to want done to us, we sidestep
this reply but at the price of committing ourselves to an unconvincing
moral criterion: after all, there are forms of behavior which some people find acceptable either as agent or as recipient but which they
should still not be entitled to inflict on others. Furthermore, if we
make the imaginative leap that reversibility requires-leave aside, for
now, the question of just what this might entail-we might not feel
any more disposed toward our recipients than we already do; indeed,
imagining our roles reversed might make us look unfavorably on
them ("were I them, I would never have behaved that way"), as the
45
stork does after her dinner-date with the fox.

Ricoeur's second answer to the question why following the
Golden Rule should militate against the impulse to harm enemies
stems from the familiar argument that genuine respect for oneself
demands respect for others and their rights, even when those others
are one's enemies. The choice to withhold such respect, or act with
positive disrespect, affects one's own self-understanding: my action,
whatever impulse it might satisfy, reveals-and reveals to me-my
weakness. "I cannot myself have self-esteem unless I esteem others as
myself."' 46 Golden Rule reasoning is one of the ways in which we confront this weakness. But it provides no guarantee that we will not succumb to it. We might conclude not only that the harm we
contemplate inflicting on our enemies is probably much the same as
that which they would inflict upon us but also that they, having
inflicted that harm, would have little trouble living with whatever
weakness this caused them to see in themselves.
43 This argument-that "other-regarding" behavior might still be self-centeredis developed specifically as a critique of Ricoeur's conception of the Golden Rule in
Mark Hunyadi, La tMgle D'Or: L'Effet-Radar, 126 REVUE DE TH9OLOGIE ET DE
PHILOSOPHIE 215, 215-22 (1994).
44 See KURT BAIER, THE MORAL POINT OF VIEw 202-23 (1958).
45 See JEAN DE LA FONTAINE, FABLES: LrvREs I-VI, at 94-95 (1995).
46 RICOEUR, supra note 38, at 193; Cf OLIVIER DU Roy, LA RECiPROCITt 44 (1970)
("[I]t is necessary that happiness consists in happiness willed for others as oneself, in
reciprocity itself.... One cannot will it for oneself without willing it for another; this
would be literally contradictory. This reciprocity of love, which is the ultimate
requirement and the highest human aspiration, includes infinite demands of truth,
self-giving, receptiveness and openness to others." (translated by author)).
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To reach this conclusion, Ricoeur thinks, is to take a position similar to that taken by Dihle when he argues that lex talionis and the
Golden Rule-an eye for an eye and do as you would be done by-are
alike insofar as they are principles of equivalence. 47 His third answer
is that the Golden Rule as it appears in the New Testament entails not
the "logic of equivalence" but the "logic of superabundance. '4 8 Crucial to this answer are the words attributed to Jesus at Luke 6:32-35:
[I]f you love only those who love you .... [I]f you do good only to
those who do good to you .... And if you lend only where you
expect to be repaid, what credit is that to you? Even sinners [do
these things] .... [Y]ou must love your enemies and do good; and
lend, without expecting any return ....49

These words should be read not as a rejection of the Golden Rule,
Ricoeur argues, but as an effort to emphasize that the Rule is founded
on "the economy of the gift."5 0° I give to (do unto) others not "for the
sake of self-interest 5 1 (that they would do the same for me), but
because I am moved by the generosity of others-by their example I
come to understand the Golden Rule as: "Because it has been given to
you, go and do likewise" (parce qu'il t'a ete donn, donne aussi d son
tour52 ). On this reading of the Golden Rule, we should be solicitous
to enemies not because of the fulfilment or self-integrity that comes
from such behavior but because to treat others as we would have them
treat us is to treat them with no expectation of receiving any benefit,
with no expectation of anything at all, in return.
It might be objected that Ricoeur's Golden Rule demands quixotic behavior. But the real problem with his version of the Rule is that
it does not allow for legitimate discrimination. Respecting enemies as
if they were me-"esteeming others as myself'-may mean treating
them with more respect than they deserve, which is not only a moral
mistake but also likely to encourage more of the behavior that made
them my enemy in the first place. 53 In one of his later works, Ricoeur
suggested that deliberators in John Rawls' so-called original position
47

See Paul Ricoeur, The Golden Rule: Exegetical and Theological Perplexities, 36 NEW
393-94 (1990).

TESTAMENT STUD. 392,

48

Id. at 394-95.

49
50

Luke 6:32-35 (New England Bible).
Ricoeur, supranote 47, at 396. A similar line of argument is developed in Alan
Kirk, "Love Your Enemies, "the Golden Rule, and Ancient Reciprocity (Luke 6:27-35), 122J.
BIBLiCAL LITERATURE 667, 673-86 (2003).
51 Ricoeur, supra note 47, at 395.
52 Paul Ricoeur, Entre Philosophie et Thdologie: la Rgle d'or en Question, 69 REVUE
3, 7 (1989).
See RUDOLF VONJHERING, Der Kampf um's Recht (Wien, 10th ed. 1891).
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engage in reasoning akin to that required by the Golden Rule, 5 4 and it
is easy to see why he should have reached this conclusion, for agents
who follow Ricoeur's version of the Golden Rule act as if behind a veil
of ignorance as to their recipients' qualities, history, motivations, and
so on. Rawls' notion ofjustice as fairness can certainly be formulated
in terms of the Golden Rule, as we will see later;5 5 nonetheless, the
Golden Rule is better described as a principle of fairness rather than
as a principle of justice. The Golden Rule requires fairness to
others-treatment of others modeled on how one would have them
treat oneself. But treatment which is fair in this sense will not always
be sufficient to achieve justice which embraces other forms of moral
action besides the Golden Rule. 56 Nor will such treatment necessarily

be equal treatment-though, insofar as the Golden Rule does permit
treating different persons differently, it requires that such treatment
be justified. 5 7 For example, a mother apportioning her estate among
her three children might decide that the fairest way to apportion it is
unequally, taking account of, say, desert. The beneficiary who is to
receive a lesser share of the estate might complain that this in fact is
not fair, and might well ask how she would have felt were she a recipient in this precise position. But her justification might be that her
decision entails no inconsistency with the Golden Rule-that she
would expect (which, of course, is not to say that she would appreciate
receiving) the same treatment were she in the position of the child
58
deserving less than his siblings.
That the Golden Rule is a principle of fairness might not seem
obvious. After all, treating others as we would have them treat us-my
removing one of the dentist's teeth, for example, just as I had her
remove one of mine-does not necessarily mean treating them fairly.
But it is implicit in the Golden Rule that we should treat others as we
would have them treat us in like cases. The dentist's case and mine are
not alike: the dentist has no need for dental treatment, and I am no
dentist. Of course, no two cases are ever exactly alike, but this does
not normally stop us from discerning what the relevant similarities
and differences between cases are (that the dentist is, unlike me, qual54 See PAUL RICOEUR, THE JUST 53-54 (David Pellauer trans., Univ. of Chicago
Press 2000) (1995).
55 See infra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
56 See 1 GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS: CHRISTIAN MORAL PRINCIPLES

212 (1983); 2 GRISEZ, supra note 17, at 327-29.

57 SeeJohn Finnis, NaturalLaw and Legal Reasoning, in NATURAL LAW THEORY 134,
137-38, 148-49 (Robert P. George ed., 1992).
58 The example is taken from Garth Hallett, The 'Incommensurability'ofValues, 28
HEYrHROPJ. 373, 379 (1987).
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ified to provide and in no need of dental treatment is obviously relevant; that the dentist is, unlike me, female, is obviously not).
Determining criteria of relevant likeness and difference in any particular instance is certainly essential if the proposition that we treat like
cases alike is not to be an empty one. 59 And even settling on criteria,
it has been argued, does not make the problem of emptiness (or circularity) go away, because all we are saying is that like cases are those
cases which our criteria tell us should be treated alike-that one case
is to be treated like another because, whatever the differences
between them, the features they share are rendered significant by the
60
criteria we have selected.
For at least two reasons, however, we should be wary of concerns
about emptiness. First, the principle of like treatment can come into
play before standards of treatment have been determined: our sense
that, say, two or more persons do or do not differ in any relevant
respect often precedes any consideration of what treatment they
should receive. 6 1 Secondly, appropriate criteria of relevant likeness
and difference are often easy to settle on and, even when they are not,
we work out methods by which to create and revise them. Lawmaking
is an obvious method. 62 Law enables the creation of rules and standards which stipulate how particular classes of persons, property, and
activities should be treated in particular instances-rules and standards which, by one or another technique (distinguishing precedents
59 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 159-60 (2d ed. 1994). It is often
assumed that Hart himself makes the assumption-that treating different cases differently must be a logical correlate of treating like cases alike. See id. at 159. But it is
possible: (1) that two cases of a certain type, although different, are nonetheless alike
in enough relevant ways to require their being treated similarly; and (2) that two cases
of a certain type, although different, are nonetheless alike in enough relevant ways to
permit but not require their being treated similarly. Consider an example offered in
TONY HONORS, MAKING LAW BIND 201 (1987). A rule stating that women are allowed
to join a club implies that men are entitled to join it as of right. See id. It does not
follow that men must be treated differently from women and so not allowed to join.
The club's rule may differentiate between men and women, but the club might still,
for example, want to secure a good mixture of male and female members. Because of
the rule, male applicants and female applicants to the club cannot demand to be
treated as if they are alike. But the rule leaves it open to the club to treat them thus if
it so wishes. See id.
60 See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 FLAv. L. REv. 537, 543-78
(1982).
61 See Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167,
1170-71 (1983).
62 SeeJohn Finnis, NaturalLaw: The Classical Tradition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 10-11 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro
eds., 2002).

2009]

GOLDEN

RULE

REASONING

1545

being the most obvious), can be modified so that previously submerged or unrecognized differences between instances are given relevance. The Golden Rule certainly entails the proposition that like
cases should be treated alike and different cases differently, and this
proposition is certainly incomplete until supplemented by criteria of
relevant likeness and difference, but it would be a mistake, I think, to
conclude that providing the necessary supplementation must be an
indefensibly circular exercise.
II.

TASTES AND OPPRESSION

The main two arguments I have advanced so far are that it is not a
good idea to try to explain the Golden Rule by reference to concepts
with which it shares characteristics (in particular: reciprocity, altruism,
and repayment thinking), and that the Rule is a sound principle of
fairness, defensible against the claim that the notion of treating like
cases alike is tautological. One might still be inclined to reject the
Golden Rule as a principle of fairness even if one accepts that it can
be defended thus. The reason one might still reject it was well summarized by Bernard Shaw: "Do not do unto others as you would have
'63
that they should do unto you. Their tastes may not be the same.
There are things that, because of my likes and dislikes, I would happily
have you do to me which you will probably not want done to you. But
if that is so, it would seem odd to describe as fair a principle which
warrants the imposition of our tastes on others.
Various seventeenth-century writers saw the problem clearly. If
the Golden Rule were simply a matter of acting according to one's
tastes qua recipient, John Goodman observed:
[A] common Drunkard mightjustifie his indeavour of debauching
other Men into that beastly Vice, under this pretence, That he doth
nothing in that case, but what he is content should be done to himself. And the Lascivious person, so he might be allowed to defile his
Neighbours Bed, would perhaps be content another should do as
64
much for him.
Why would we assume that the Golden Rule does not permit such
actions? For Goodman, "my Obligation from this Rule" is "that I both
do... towards him, all that which... I should think that Neighbour
of mine bound to do . . . towards me in the like Case,"65 and "that is to
63 BERNARD
(1903).
64

SHAW, Maxims for Revolutionists, in

MAN

AND

SUPERMAN

227, 227

JOHN GOODMAN, THE GOLDEN RULE, OR, THE ROYAL LAw OF EQUITY EXPLAINED

22 (London, Samuel Roycroft 1688).
65 Id. at 26.
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But introducing the

concept of obligation in this way does not free us from the problem of
tastes: in a specific instance I might think that if my role and the recipient's were reversed, then I would consider the recipient bound to act
in a particular way, and so take that action myself; but the recipient
still might not consider that action fair or appropriate.
Other writers of the period offered a different answer: that we are
disinclined to impose our tastes on others because we know that it
could just as easily be others imposing their tastes on us. "[W] ith what
imaginable justice can I do that to him," Matthew Hale asked, "that I
judge unfit or unjust for him to do to me; or with what pretence of
justice, or congruity, can I judge that which is fit for him to do to me,
to be unfit for me to do for him?" 67 The point is echoed by Benjamin
Camfield: Golden Rule reasoning demands that we "think of our
selves in other men, and of others in our selves, a due respect being
had to the several circumstances and distinctions of our qualities and
conditions"6 8 (what Hale calls a "transposing of the persons by way of
fiction or supposition" 69 ). "[E]very one is governed by his own Rea-

son," Hobbes declared, and so "[i]t followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a Right to every thing; even to one anothers

66 Id. at 30.
67 MATrHEW HALE, Of Doing as We Would Be Done Unto, in 1 The WORKS, MORAL
AND RELIGIOUS 377, 381-82 (Thomas Thirlwall ed., London, R. Wilks 1805). The
essay appears not to have been published before 1805. See EDMUND HEWARD, MATTHEW HALE 129 (1972).
68 CAMFIELD, supra note 2, at 62. Jeffrey Wattles claims that Camfield's book was
"discovered too late" to be included in Wattles' own study. WATTLES, supra note 5, at
211 n.2. Wattles does, however, discuss a "treatise" entitled "The Comprehensive Rule of
Righteousness, Do as You Would Be Done By," by "the Reverend Father in God William
Lord Bishop of St. David's," which Wattles states was published by William Leach in
1679. Id. at 247. The quotations that Wattles attributes to Bishop William are in fact
quotations from Camfield's treatise, which, on the unnumbered page preceding page
one, carries an advertisement for a text entitled "An Apology for the Church of England in
Point of SeperationfromIt," published by William Leach in 1679, the work of "the Lord
Father in God William Lord Bishop of St. David." CAMFIELD, supranote 2. Wattles did
not discover Camfield's treatise too late to include it in his own study-he was working from it all along, but took the name on the advertisement page to be the name of
the author.
69 HALE, supra note 67, at 386; see also id. at 405-06 ("Unless in the transposing of
persons, in order to make my judgment of what I would or would not that another
should do to me, and consequently to make up thereby what I do to him; I say, unless
in such a case, I should use that judgment which I have at the time of such deliberation and conclusions, there will follow uncertainty and deception in the application of
this rule . .

").
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body. 7 0 But "[f] or as long as every man holdeth this Right... are all
men in the condition of Warre," for "if other men will not lay down
their Right, as well as he ...there is no Reason for any one, to devest
himselfe of his."'7 1 And so, "to dipose himselfe to Peace" rather than
"to expose himselfe to Prey," it is important that "a man ... be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow
other men against himselfe," that he accept the "Law of the Gospell;
Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to
72
them."
This argument-that Golden Rule reasoning urges moderation,
because "actions are not so prone to bring about evils when performed in the light of what we would like to have others do for us"73should not be dismissed summarily. The Rule is easily grasped, easily
74
It
formulated, and requires no special learning or intelligence.
helps us, when determining our actions, to see beyond our own
impulses and interests, for it involves not mere imposition of desirewhat I want to do to another-but ascertainment of desire by reference to what I would have another do in light of my imagining myself
as that other.
The result is that the desire at the satisfaction of which my action
aims is neither my desire nor [the other's], as it existed prior to the
application of the Rule, but my desire as seen through, and modified by, something that unites us, directing my action towards him
75
and projecting my desires into him.
70 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 189-90 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books
1968) (1651).
71 Id. at 190.
72 Id. (emphasis omitted). See Adalbert Langer, Die Goldene Regel-ein Schliissel
zum Fieden, in KIRCHE, RECHT UND LAND 67, 67-74 (F. Lorenz ed., 1969), for a somewhat superficial attempt to lend support to this thesis and show that throughout history the Golden Rule has been called upon to maintain peace.
73 PAUL WEISS, MAN'S FREEDOM 139 (1950); cf Paul Weiss, The Golden Rule, 38J.
PHIL. 421, 422 (1941) ("The Golden Rule... incorporates the observation that deeds
are more likely to be just when performed by individuals who assume the standpoint
of their patients.").
74 See, e.g., GEORGE BORASTON, THE ROYAL LAw, OR, THE GOLDEN RULE OF JUSTICE
AND CHARITY 10 (London, Walter Kettilby 1684); HOBBES, supra note 70, at 214
("[Llawes of nature . . .contracted into one easie sum, intelligible, even to the
meanest capacity ....").
75 A.T. Cadoux, The Implications of the Golden Rule, 22 INT'L J. ETHICS 272, 277
(1912). The argument is rehearsed at length by Philipp Schmitz, Die Goldene RegelSchiissel zum ethischen Kontext, in CHRIS-LICH GLAUBEN UND HANDELN 208, 208-22
(Klaus Demmer & Bruno Schuller eds., 1977). See also MICHAEL SHERMER, THE SCIENCE OF GOOD AND EVIL 185-86 (2004), for the argument that the moderating capacity of Golden Rule reasoning is especially evident if we imagine asking recipients if
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But even though the argument should not be dismissed summarily, it is not surprising that some contemporaries and near-contemporaries of Hobbes thought the Golden Rule in need of justification.
The claim that the agent's and the recipient's desires are somehow
united in the process of Golden Rule reasoning makes light of possible conflict between the two sets of desires. If I were in your situation,
I know how I would treat someone who is in my current situation. But
I also know, and bemoan the fact, that since it is not me but you in
your situation, someone in my situation will be treated very differently
from how I would treat them. How, then, am I to follow the Golden
Rule? Am I supposed to imagine myself as me in your situation? As
you in your situation? As an amalgamation of me and you? If it is the
latter, how do I follow the Golden Rule if our desires cannot be reconciled? And even if our desires can be reconciled-this is a problem
we must return to-how am I to act if fulfilling them requires morally
condemnable or legally impermissible behavior? Though the Golden
Rule might commonly be regarded as "that most unshaken Rule of
Morality, and Foundation of all social Virtue," Locke observed, one
might "without absurdity" ask that its "Truth and Reasonableness" be
"deduced" rather than assumed. 76 Leibniz went further: the Rule
"requires not only proof but also elucidation." 77 If we are inclined to

make excessive demands of others, for example, "do we also owe to
others more than their share?"178 When we apply the Golden Rule, it
does not serve as, but rather we supplement it with, a "standard"
according to which we judge what should be owed to and expected
from others.

79

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the claim that
the Golden Rule is unsatisfactory as a principle of fairness because it
cannot be disconnected from the particular desires of agents and
recipients was bolstered by two arguments from unexpected quarters.
First, there is Kant's critique of the Golden Rule. At first glance, Kant
they would mind our treating them in a particular way; merely to envisage posing the
question will sometimes clarify for us the incompatibility between our contemplated
action and how we would have them treat us in the same circumstances.
76 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 68 (Peter H.
Nidditch ed., Clarendon Press 1975) (1689).
77 See G.W. LEIBNIz, NEW ESSAYS ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 91 (Peter Remnant &
Jonathan Bennett eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1981) (1765).
78 Id.
79 See id. at 92. The proper standard is, Leibniz continues, "the point of view of
other people." Id. In a similar skeptical vein, see ROBERT SHARROCK, YPOTHESIS
But see 2 SAMUEL
ETHIKE DE OFFICIIS SECUNDUM NATURAE JUS ch. 2 n.11 (1660).
PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI Ocro 205 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A.
Oldfather trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1934) (1688) (opposing Sharrock's skepticism).
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is an unlikely opponent of the Golden Rule. "Do to others as you
would have them do to you," it has been argued, is consistent with the
first element of the categorical imperative8 0 : that one should act only
according to principles that one can rationally will everyone to act on
(that one would "will that it become a universal law"'). The more
common (and correct) philosophical argument, however, is that the
categorical imperative and the Golden Rule differ significantly, primarily because the former enjoins everyone to submit to universal standards whereas the latter requires that we set our standards of action
according to how we would have others act toward us. 8 2 Kant himself
clearly regarded the Golden Rule to be a somewhat feeble principle of
moral action:
Let one not think that the trivial quod tibi non visfieri, etc. [What

you do not want to be done to yourself do not do to another] could
serve here as a standard or principle. For it is only derived from
that principle [that one should act only according to that which one
can will to "become a universal law"], though with various limitations; it cannot be a universal law, for it does not contain the
ground of duties toward oneself, nor that of duties of love toward
others (for many would gladly acquiesce that others should not be
beneficent to him, if only he might be relieved from showing beneficence to them), or finally of owed duties to one another, for the
criminal would argue on this ground against the judge who pun83
ishes him, etc.
In the twentieth century, Golden Rule reasoning underwent
something of a philosophical revival. The philosophy that came out
of this revival we will consider in due course. All that need be noted
now is that those primarily responsible for the revival were significantly inspired by Kant. That this should be so might seem odd, considering what Kant thought of the Golden Rule as a moral principle.
But although Kant was correct to insist that the Golden Rule and the
categorical imperative are not the same, it would be a mistake to think
that the Golden Rule cannot be universalized. Objections might be
raised, furthermore, to all of the three criticisms he advances to show
that the Golden Rule cannot be a universal law. His first criticism,
S.B. Thomas, Jesus and Kant: A Problem in Reconciling Two Different Points
80 See, e.g.,
of View, 79 MIND 188 (1970).
81 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 37 (Allen W.
Wood ed. & trans., Yale Univ. Press 2002) (1785) (emphasis omitted).
Peter A. Carmichael, Kant and Jesus, 33 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL
82 See, e.g.,
RES. 412, 412 (1973); E.W. Hirst, The CategoricalImperative and the Golden Rule, 9 PHILOSOPHY

83

328, 329-31 (1934).

KANT, supra note 81, at 48 n.* (first alteration in original).
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that the Rule cannot incorporate duties to oneself, is valid only so
long as one assumes that the Rule exclusively concerns agents' actions
only as actions having an effect on recipients. But as we will see when
we consider how the Golden Rule has been understood by natural
lawyers-we have already encountered the point in relation to
Ricoeur's work 4-the choice to follow or ignore the Golden Rule is
one that has an impact on the agent, on his or her self-esteem or
character, as well as on the recipient. To adopt language typical of
Golden Rule theorists in the natural law tradition: when I refuse to do
the good to others that I would have them do to me in like instances, I
fail and disappoint myself as well as my recipients.
Kant's second and third criticisms merge insofar as they concern
tastes: using Golden Rule reasoning I might opt out of particular
duties, Kant thinks, by acquiescing to your not owing those duties to
me, or by observing that although my office (as a judge, for example)
obliges me to dispense a particular treatment-sentencing criminals
to imprisonment-I can escape that obligation by reasoning that I
would not welcome receiving that treatment. 85 The first of these two
arguments involves imagining oneself not as another but another as
oneself: I don't understand why you're upset that I didn't buy you a
present, because I wouldn't have minded if it were me who wasn't
bought a present. The second is possibly a more serious distortion in
that it entails the assumption that Golden Rule reasoning is straightforwardly bilateral when in fact it will often be multilateral: keeping
with Kant's example, the judge who sentences a criminal to imprisonment is making a decision not only about how the criminal should be
treated but about how the wider community should be treated as well;
the judge who refuses to imprison the criminal because he would not
want to be imprisoned were he in the criminal's shoes could be
accused of treating others-probably many others-in a way that he
would not want to be treated were he one of them.8 6 In such a scenario, the nineteenth-century moralist Richard Whately observes, it is

84 See supra notes 38-58 and accompanying text.
85 This last line of reasoning is also adopted by Hans Kelsen. "It is quite evident,"
according to Kelsen, "that the golden rule, if applied to cases of its violation, must
lead to absurd consequences; for nobody wants to be punished, even if he has committed a crime." HANS KELSEN, What IsJustice, in WHAT isJusTiCE? 1, 17 (1957). Kelsen probably did not appreciate that Kant had criticized the Golden Rule in the same
way, for he asserts that "[i]t was evidently the golden rule... which inspired... Kant
to his formulation of," indeed which provided the "model" for, "the categorical
imperative." Id. at 17-18.
86 See R.M. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON 115-16 (1963).
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unlikely that even the criminal will fail to see what the judge applying
the Golden Rule is bound by reason to do:
[I]f you had a cause to be tried, though of course you would wish
the decision be in your favor, you would be sensible that all you
could reasonably expect of the judge would be that he should lay aside

all prejudice, and attend impartially and carefully to the evidence,
and decide according to the best of his ability. And this ... is what
87
an upright judge will do.

Although the Golden Rule might be defended against Kant's criticisms, to mount the defense is to risk overlooking the most important
point: that these criticisms struck a nerve. Various twentieth-century
German philosophers have argued that insofar as the Golden Rule has
been discredited as a philosophical concept, principal responsibility
for the achievement must go to Kant.8 8

Nonetheless, the defense

against the third of Kant's criticisms of the Golden Rule-that the
judge's decision not to send a criminal to prison constitutes treatment
of others besides the criminal himself-is worth lingering over,
because it illustrates the second unexpected line of argument that I
want to examine: that the Golden Rule is defensible as a utilitarian
principle. Note that this is not Whately's defense: for him, the judge
sentences the criminal to a term in prison, even though he would not
wish to endure this sentence himself, because he understands that his
obligation is to do "not what [he] might wish in each case, but what
[he] would regard as fair, right,just, reasonable,if [he] were in another
person's place."8 9 The utilitarian argument, by contrast, is that if the
preference of Y (for example, the community's preference for law
and order) counts for more than that of X (for example, the criminal's preference that he walk free from court) then the judge's decision for Y is defensible on the basis of interpersonal utility
comparison.
87

RICHARD WHATELY, INTRODUCTORY LESSONS

ON

MORALS,

AND CHRISTIAN

Evi-

27 (Cambridge, John Bartlett 1857).
88 See, e.g., HANS REINER, DUTY AND INCLINATION 274-75 (Mark Santos trans.,
1983); Hans-Ulrich Hoche, Die Goldene Regel: Neue Aspekte eines alten Moralprinzips [ The
Golden Rule: New Aspects of an Old Moral Principle], 32 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR PHILOSOPHISCHE
FORSCHUNG 355, 355-56 (1978); Hans Reiner, Die "Goldene Regel" Die Bedeutung einer
sittlichen Grundformel der Menscheit [ The Golden Rule: The Importance of a Basic Formula of
DENCES

the Moral Humanity], 3

ZEITSCHRIr FOR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG

74, 79-81

(1948);

Hans Reiner, Die Goldene Regel und das Naturrecht: Zugleich Antwort auf die Frage: Gibt es
ein Naturrecht?[ The Golden Rule and NaturalLaw: Or an Answer to the Question: Is There a
Natural Law?], 9 STUDtA LEIBNITIANA 231, 233 (1977) [hereinafter Reiner, Die Goldene
Regel und das Naturrecht].
89 WHATELY, supra note 87, at 26.
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What, however, if the choice between the preferences of Xand Y
is not clear, so that my asking what I would want if I were X or a
member of Ygives me not an obvious answer but conflicting prescriptions regarding the right course of action? Golden Rule reasoning is
still defensible, John Harsanyi argues, so long as I make "the fictitious
assumption" that "I would not know in advance what my actual social
position would be in" a society that accepted the preferences of X or
one that favored those of Yand so long as there would be "the same
probability of [my] occupying any possible social position" in either
system. 90 Given this "equiprobability postulate," 91 and given that my
imagined choice-which Harsanyi envisages as a choice between
large-scale systems (such as between capitalism and socialism) 9 2 rather
than a preference between particular mundane options-requires me
to consider what I am willing to risk, I will do what any "rational individual" would do and choose the "social system that would maximize
[my] expected utility.

9 3s

As a defense of Golden Rule reasoning, Har-

sanyi's argument is open to criticism primarily because of a second
postulate that he advances, the similarity postulate, discussion of
which is deferred until we turn to the problem of the imaginative
leap. 9 4 This is not, however, to imply that we ought to endorse the

equiprobability postulate. It is unclear not only why I must postulate
equiprobability of possible social positions when evaluating my prospects under, say, two different systems, but also, given that I have no
knowledge of what my social position would be under either system,
why I must choose the one which would maximize my expected
utility.
90

95

John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior, 44 Soc. REs. 623,

631-32, 634 (1977); see id. at 624 (endorsing specifically the Golden Rule as a moral
principle).
91 Id. at 632 (emphasis omitted).
92 See id. at 631-32.
93 Id. at 632.
94 See infra text accompanying notes 217-19.
95 See David Gauthier, On the Refutation of Utilitarianism,in THE LIMITS OF UTILITAiA iNsm 144, 155-60 (Harlan B. Miller & William H. Williams eds., 1982). "In the
kind of choice required by Harsanyi's argument," Gauthier concludes,

the chooser does not know who he is, and so cannot express a single set of
preferences, to be represented by a single utility function. Not only do the
prospects among which he expresses preferences involve his coming to possess different personal characteristics; he is required to express each preference from the standpoint of the person with those characteristics. He does
not have a single, unified standpoint from which to establish a preference
ordering. The ordering that can be derived from calculating the average
expected utility for each prospect is not the preference ordering of any indi-
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The conventional utilitarian defense of Golden Rule reasoning
says nothing about multilateralism or the possibility of an agent's
action affecting different recipients with conflicting utility functions.
Rather it is based on the conviction, vividly articulated by Seneca, that
there are gains to be had from treating those subject to our power
with kindness. 9 6 Those whom we treat as we would like to be treated
are likely to appreciate and, in one way or another, reward our behavior. "In the golden rule ofJesus of Nazareth," Mill wrote, "we read the
complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as you would be done by,
and to love your neighbour as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection
of utilitarian morality. '9 7 Since treating others as you would have
them treat you usually means treating others benevolently, and since
benevolence normally begets benevolence, following the Golden Rule
is likely to increase aggregate utility. 98
This conventional utilitarian defense is remarkably weak. It commits us to a means-end explanation of treating others as we would
have them treat us, which, as we have seen, is actually contrary to the
Golden Rule, respect for which requires that we sometimes act against
those who would reward us were we to support their interests. Doing
as you would be done by hardly constitutes "the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality," furthermore, if an increase in aggregate utility is only
the probable consequence of such action, if it is possible that Golden
Rule-motivated action could, say, generate disutility (because, for
example, a recipient considers, and tells the agent that she considers,
the action patronizing). Mill seems to have in mind, when he writes
of "ideal perfection," a universalized neighbor principle: to generate
the greatest happiness for the greatest number we should love our
neighbor-interpreting this word to mean anyone else-as ourselves.
It is certainly Mill's version of "the doctrine of neighbourly love" that
John Mackie has in mind when he dismisses it as evidently "impracticable," given that "[p] eople simply are not going to put the interests
of all their 'neighbours' on an equal footing with their own interests
vidual chooser. The existence of a single interpersonal utility measure does
not entail the existence of a single preference ordering.
Id. at 159.
96 See SENECA, Epistle xlvii: On Man and Slave 11 (c. 63-65 AD), reprinted in EPisTLES 301, 307 (Richard M. Gummere trans., 1917); see also ARISTEAS TO PHILOCRATES
(LETTER OF ARISTEAS) 185 (Moses Hadas ed. & trans., Ktav Publ'g 1973) (1951)
(expressing the overriding theme of the letter's narrative: "God . . . always promises
the greatest blessings to the just").
97 JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 268 (Mary Warnock ed., Meridian 1962)
(1861).
98 See Cadoux, supra note 75, at 280-83.
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and specific purposes and with the interests of those who are literally
near to them." 99 But the conception of the neighbor principle which
Mill upholds and Mackie dismisses is vacuous. If the principle really
did make no distinction between personal interests (including the
interests of those near to us) and everyone else's interests, then it
would provide no reason for us not to act selfishly, for-as with the
"very simple idea" of Dostoyevky's Luzhin' 0 0-selfish behavior would
be on an equal footing with, no less benevolent than, any other form
of behavior.
Love-of-neighbor permits of a variety of plausible interpretations
even if one confines oneself to the principle as it appears in the New
Testament.' 0 But of course not all interpretations of the principle
are plausible. Just as it would be a mistake to interpret "love" in this
context to mean idealized or romantic love-as opposed to readiness
and willingness to benefit or promote the well-being of othersl 0 2 -so
too it is a mistake to think that "neighbor" is so indiscriminate as to
require undifferentiated treatment as between, say, the interests and
needs of strangers on the one hand and those of oneself, one's family,
and one's friends on the other. Certainly loving one's neighbor as
oneself means treating all others as persons with value and dignity
equal to one's own. But to love one's neighbor as oneself in the sense
of being indiscriminately concerned with the welfare and interests of
everybody and anybody is to make a choice contrary to practical intelligence and reasonableness, for one could not be genuinely and indiscriminately concerned in this way and also lead one's own life: selfabnegation on such a scale would suffocate personhood. A rational
approach to life can embrace the doctrine of neighborly love only so
long as the doctrine is understood to demand reasonable discrimination in favor of one's own interests and those of one's family, friends,
03
and particular groups.
99 J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS 130-31 (1990).
100 See FYODOR DosTovEvsKv, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 167 (David Magarshack
trans., Penguin 1966) (1866) ("[Tlhe more successfully private business is run ....
the more solid are the foundations of our social life and the greater is the general
well-being of the people. Which means that by acquiring wealth exclusively and only
for myself, I'm by that very fact acquiring it, as it were, for everybody and helping to
bring about a state of affairs in which my neighbour will get something better... as a
result of the higher standard of living for all. It's really a very simple idea, but unfortunately it hasn't been generally accepted for a long time . .. ").
101 See Donald Clark Hodges, The Golden Rule and Its Deformations, 38 PERSONALIST
130, 132 (1957).
102 See 2 GRISEZ, supra note 17, at 307-09.

103

SeeJOHN

FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS

107-09 (1980); see also

Richard W. Wright, The Principles of Justice, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1859, 1868-69
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For our purposes, the most significant problem with the conventional utilitarian defense is that it actually highlights how the Golden
Rule, explained in terms of the desires of agents and recipients, fares
poorly as a principle of fairness. Since the Golden Rule requires us to
act only as we ourselves would consider acceptable were we the recipient rather than the agent, Ricoeur argues, it opposes the utilitarian
"logic of the scapegoat," whereby sacrificing the interests "of some
unfavored individuals or groups" is permissible "if that is required by
the good of the greatest number."'10 4 But the conventional utilitarian
conception of the Golden Rule does not exclude the possibility of
such logic. Two parties might collude so that A treats B as he would
have B treat him and B treats A as he would have A treat him so that A
and B gain to the disadvantage of C.105 Some utilitarians acknowledge the difficulty. Collusion of this nature might be deemed antisocial action-this would appear to be the conclusion favored by
Harsanyi-which, because it is essentially action against "members of
the same moral community," must have "no claim for a hearing when
it comes to our concept of social utility."10 6 To exclude antisocial
preferences from the social utility function, however, is not to refine
utilitarian ethical theory but to concede (as not all utilitarians would
concede'0 7) that its moral reach must be limited in a particular way.
Moreover, if collusive action lacks a third-party victim, if it affects
nobody but the parties who consent to it, then it might be argued that
it is not self-evidently a case of antisocial preference satisfaction (that
is, behavior directed against members of the same moral community).
Yet such action might still be morally questionable.
(2000) ("'To do as you would be done by, and to love your neighbor as yourself,
constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.'" (quoting JOHN STUART MILL,
UTILITARIANISM,

in 10

COLLECTED WORKS OFJOHN STUART MILL

218 (J.M. Robson ed.,

Univ. of Toronto Press 1963) (1861))).

104 RICOEUR, supra.note 54, at 52-53.
105 This is exactly what happened at the end of the 1977 English football league
season: two teams facing each other on the final match day, Bristol City and Coventry
City, needed only to draw with one another to avoid relegation so long as a third
relegation-threatened team, Sunderland, lost its match. In the final minutes of the
Bristol-Coventry match, news flashed up on the message board that Sunderland had
lost. The score at that point between Bristol and Coventry was 2-2. A zero sum game
immediately became a non-zero one: the teams stopped competing and spent the

remainder of the match running down the clock to ensure a draw and Sunderland's
relegation. See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 222-24 (2d ed. 1989).
106 Harsanyi, supra note 90, at 647.
107 Cf J.J.C. Smart, An Outline of a UtilitarianSystem of Ethics, in UTILITARIANISM:
FOR AND AGAINST 3, 25-26 (1973) (arguing that pleasure derived from antisocial preferences can, under unique circumstances, maximize utility).
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Another utilitarian saw the problem clearly and indeed, espied a
route to solving it. The traditional formulation of the Golden Rule,
"do to others as you would have them do to you," "is obviously
unprecise," Henry Sidgwick observed, "for one might wish for
another's co-operation in sin, and be willing to reciprocate it."108 If

we try to make the Rule more precise by saying "that we ought to do to
others only what we think it right for them to do to us" our difficulties
persist, for the "differences in the circumstances-and even in the
natures-of two individuals, A and B" (A, for example, being a child
and B his parent), may "make it wrong for A to treat B in the way in
which it is right for B to treat A."' 0 9 For an illustration of "the
'Golden Rule' precisely stated"' 10 we do well, Sidgwick thought, to
look to Samuel Clarke's Rule of Equity: "[w]hatever I judge reasonable or unreasonable, that Another should do for Me, that by the same
judgment I declare reasonable or unreasonable, that inthe like case
should do for Him." '' Clarke's formulation is important not only
because it makes explicit something that we have observed as implicit
in the Golden Rule-that we are to treat others as we would have
them treat us in similar instances (instances that, though they may
differ on their facts, demand from the agent a similar attitude or disposition)-but also because it suggests that the Rule requires us to do
to others the good that we would have them do to us (and to avoid
doing to them the harm that we would have them avoid doing to us).
That this is what Clarke understands reasonableness to mean is absolutely clear: "that which is Good is fit and reasonable, and that which
is Evil is unreasonable to be done."1' 12
Sidgwick, for his own part, recasts the Rule in a "negative form":
"it cannot be right" for me to do to you what it would be wrong for
you to do to me "without there being any difference between [our]
natures or circumstances . . .which can be stated as a reasonable

ground for difference of treatment.""13 I may well-to recall and
reply to Bernard Shaw's quip-do to others what I would not have
them do to me precisely because I recognize the distinctness of our
circumstances: the dentist's treatment of me, it will be recalled, is not
treatment she would want to receive from me. The "practical impor108

HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS

109
110
111

Id.
Id. at 385.
SAMUEL CLARKE,

OF NATURAL RELIGION

A

380 (7th ed., Hackett 1981) (1907).

DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE UNCHANGEABLE OBLIGATIONS

86-87 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1964) (1706); see also SIDGWICK,

supra note 108, at 384-85 (discussing Clarke's "rules of righteousness").
112 CLARKE, supra note 111, at 92.

113

SIDGWICK,

supra note 108, at 380.
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tance" of this insight, "and its truth, so far as it goes, appear[s] to me
1 14
self-evident," Sidgwick concludes.
He also observes, however, that it "manifestly does not give complete guidance."'115 The "natures or circumstances" of A and B may
be the same insofar as both "wish for" and are "willing to reciprocate"
the other's "co-operation in sin." One early critic of Sidgwick, John
Bigelow, flatly denied this possibility: "[N] o one is willing to cooperate
with another in sinning against himself ....
It is impossible to conceive of a person wronging another if he knew that he himself was to
be wronged and to suffer simultaneously and to precisely the same
extent."' 1 6 No doubt Bigelow, clearly aghast that anyone could interpret the principle that we should do to others as we would have them
do to us in the same circumstances as a potential endorsement of
cooperation in sin, would have concurred with Mill when he observed
that "It] here is no difficulty in proving any ethical standard whatever
'' 1 7
to work ill, if we suppose universal idiocy to be conjoined with it. 1
But the interpretation is not foolish. In R v. Brown' 18 -as even
the most unreceptive students of English law never seem to forgetthe appellants admitted to having engaged in private, consensual,
homosexual sadomasochistic acts but were unaware that in doing so
they were committing a criminal offence. The activities which were
the subject matter of the prosecution-"violence to the buttocks,
anus, penis, testicles and nipples"'' 19 -would probably lead anyone
not inclined to participate in them to react with "horror, amazement
or incomprehension, perhaps sadness"; 120 even the activities which
were not the subject of any charge on the indictment, Lord Mustill
envisaged, "very few could read . . . a summary of ... without dis-

gust."1 21 Yet as Lord Slynn remarked,
Astonishing though it may seem the persons involved positively
wanted, asked for, the acts to be done to them, acts which it seems
from the evidence some of them also did to themselves .... The
matter came to the attention of the police 'coincidentally' ... . The

acts did not result in any permanent or serious injury or disability or

114

Id.

115
116

BiGELOW, supra note

Id.

117
118
119
120

MILL,

121

Id.

4, at 87-88.
supra note 97, at 275.

(1994) 1 A.C. 212 (H.L.).
Id. at 236 (per Lord Templeman).
Id. at 257 (per Lord Mustill).
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any infection and no medical assistance was required even though
12 2
there may have been some risk of infection, even injury.
The acts took place in private, did not involve children or drugs, and
were self-regulated in the sense that participants used code words
when they could not bear further infliction of pain.
Counsel for the appellants in Brown could have argued-there is
no evidence that they did argue-that their actions were defensible
on the basis of the conventional utilitarian conception of the Golden
Rule: agents treated recipients essentially as they would have recipients treat them (as the recipients, qua agents, generally did treat
them), recipients were not coerced, and the utility gains of those
involved were not negated by costs to third parties. The majority of
the House of Lords dismissed the appeal, finding the appellants guilty
of various counts of assault contrary to the Offences of the Person Act
of 1861, primarily because consent cannot be a defense to any act
which one person does to another. The appellants themselves
"recognised . . . that there must be some limitation upon the harm
which an individual could consent to receive at the hand of
another."' 123 The physical danger to those engaging in homosexual
sadomasochistic activity will often be serious and unregulated-"good
luck rather than good judgment"124 appeared to explain why no grave
injury had been suffered by the appellants in Brown-and so limiting
"the extent to which an individual may consent to infliction [of bodily
harm] upon himself by another"'125 is necessarily "in the public
interest."126
This public interest argument was not only framed in terms of
there having to be some violent actions which cannot be defended by
pointing to the victim's consent. More than once their Lordships,
echoing Clarke, contended that the reciprocated action of the appellants could not be legally condoned if it was intrinsically evil (unreasonable). "Pleasure derived from the infliction of pain is an evil
thing," Lord Templeman observed. 127 "[T]he practices of the appellants were ... degrading to body and mind and were developed with
increasing barbarity" and "[c]ruelty to human beings."12 8 Nothing
about the practices, Lord Lowry insisted, could "be regarded as conducive to the enhancement or enjoyment of family life or conducive
122
123
124
125
126

Id. at 281.
Id. at 238 (per Lord Jauncey).
Id. at 246.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 246.

127

Id. at 237 (per Lord Templeman).

128

Id. at 235-36.
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to the welfare of society." 129 It is difficult to imagine that even those
attracted to these practices would describe them otherwise. To argue
that these practices might be legally condoned on the basis that A is
simply doing to B what B would have A do to him is to make the
mistake-a mistake often attributable to utilitarian defenders of the
Golden Rule-of thinking that the nature or quality of the Golden
Rule follower's action is irrelevant, that the justification for the action
is the apparent fact that the mutual satisfaction of preferences
increases average utility.
I have emphasized this mistake, but I have also referred to a natural law conception of the Golden Rule which does not treat the nature
or quality of the Rule follower's action as irrelevant. The Golden Rule
as a feature of natural law theory is a theme that needs our attention,
though for the moment it remains some way in the distance. Let me
conclude this Part as I began it, with a summary of the argument so
far. The Golden Rule is, I claim, defensible as a principle of fairness.
I have tried to show, however, that this defense cannot be mounted
successfully if the Golden Rule is not detached from the desires of
agents and recipients, that the Rule cannot be entertained seriously as
a principle of fairness if it amounts to the proposition that we are
entitled to impose upon others the preferences that we would happily
have imposed on us. But what reasons might there be for concluding
that the Golden Rule amounts to anything more than this? It is to this
question that we turn next.
III.

REMEDIAL WORK

"Reflective people want to satisfy themselves" that their judg30
ments and decisions will withstand serious scrutiny.'
They also want to satisfy other people, whose interests are affected
by what they do, that they are acting out of tested conviction and
with integrity. So they try to explain their convictions in a way that
displays reflection, sincerity, and coherence, even when they have
3
no hope of converting others to those convictions.' '
This argument-voiced by Ronald Dworkin in this instance-is reminiscent of that of the first great American votary of principled judicial
decisionmaking, Herbert Wechsler, who, in his famous article of 1959,
suggested that "the judicial process ...must be genuinely principled,
resting... on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate
result that is achieved," meaning that "courts.
129
130
131

Id. at 255 (per Lord Lowry).
RONALD DwoMaN, JUsTICE IN ROBES

Id.

80 (2006).

.

. should decide ...on
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grounds of adequate neutrality and generality"-grounds, that is,
which ought to be intelligible to those with "an opposing interest" as
132
well as to those whose interests they support.
Wechsler was notoriously diffident when it came to accepting the
"challenge" of specifying a "neutral" principle to apply to the schoolsegregation cases, 1 3 3 and he certainly did not explicitly entertain the
possibility that the Golden Rule could fit the bill. That it could might
seem remote: the racist confronted with the proposition that segregation means treating others in a way that he would not have them treat
him might reply that he would be perfectly happy for those others to
insist on at least keeping their lives separate from his, that support for
segregation, so far as he is concerned, does not offend against the
Golden Rule. John F. Kennedy saw the matter differently. Speaking
in 1963, in the wake of Governor George Wallace's stand against
desegregation at the University of Alabama, he observed that American citizens were
confronted primarily with a moral issue. It is as old as the Scriptures and is as clear as the American Constitution. The heart of the
question is whether all Americans are to be afforded equal rights
and equal opportunities; whether we are going to treat our fellow
13 4
Americans as we want to be treated.
Robert M. MacIver, President of New York's New School of Social
Research at the time that Kennedy spoke, had a decade earlier proclaimed the Golden Rule "a principle in the name of which we can
appeal to all men, one to which their reason can respond in spite of
their differences .... [It is] the only universal of ethics that does not
6
take sides."' 3 5 Kennedy and MacIver-like Sidgwick and Clarke' -

were making a connection between the Golden Rule and universalized moral judgments: if, say, according equal rights and opportunities is a form of treatment which is considered unqualifiedly good,
then it must be a good for all people, irrespective of their identity.
The Golden Rule, understood thus, is a neutral (impartial)
13 7
principle.
132

Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73

HARv.

L.

REV. 1, 15 (1959).

133 See id. at 34.
134 PresidentJohn F. Kennedy, Televised Address (June 11, 1963) (transcript available at Transcript of the President'sAddress, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1963, at A20).
135 Robert M. MacIver, The Deep Beauty of the Golden Rule, in MORAL PRINCIPLES OF
ACTION 39, 41-42 (Ruth Nanda Anshen ed., 1952).
136 See CLARKE, supra note 111, at 86; SIDGWCK, supra note 108, at 379.
137 Cf Martha C. Nussbaum, Golden Rule Arguments: A Missing Thought?, in THE
MoRAL CIRCLE AND THE SELF 3, 3-16 (Kim-chong Chong et at. eds., 2003). Nussbaum
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It is important to be careful with this argument. Although "the
meaning of 'good' and 'right' . . . are left undefined by the Golden

Rule," Gould claims, "society... supplies the definition" 13 8 and "content" 139 for both notions through "[c]ustom"

beliefs" 141

140

and the "orthodox

person."1 42

of "the ordinary
So long as a community has
worked out where it stands on "good" and "right," in other words, we
have everything we need to supply content to the Golden Rule. Yet
Gould concedes that, on "the ethical problem of segregation," midtwentieth-century America appeared not to have worked out where it
stood. 143 Various twentieth-century moral philosophers believed that
the Golden Rule is indeed an impartial principle of moral action. But
argues, pace DAVID S. NIVISON, THE WAYS OF CONFUcqi.SM 59-76 (Brian W. Van Norden ed., 1996), that it is difficult to see why ancient Chinese philosophers would not,
just like their ancient Greek counterparts, have recognized that all human beings are
equally vulnerable to chance and that one's fortunes are not fixed, and why recognition of this fact-that chance is a great leveler-should not have made its way into
Chinese Golden Rule reasoning: we should not assume, in other words, that for the
ancient Chinese philosophers our concern for others less advantaged is largely motivated by the fact that we, but for the grace of God (as it were), could have been them.
That Golden Rule reasoning should be understood as tempered by a recognition of
the equality of fortune Nussbaum thinks exemplified by a comment of President Bill
Clinton's in his First Inaugural Address: "'[B]ut for fate, we-the fortunate and the
unfortunate-might have been each other."' Nussbaum, supra, at 12 (quoting President Bill Clinton, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 1993), available at http://
www.bartleby.com/124/pres64.html). This is, Nussbaum says, "the standard combination of a golden rule appeal to imagination with the missing thought about the
vicissitudes of fortune," id. at 12, the thought which is possibly missing, that is, from
Nivison's account of Chinese Golden Rule reasoning.
Like Nussbaum, I am "a complete amateur in matters Chinese," id. at 3, and so I
do not know if this thought is missing from, in the sense that it ought to have been
present in, Nivison's account. But I think that if the ancient Chinese did make this
combination, then they, like Nussbaum, would have been making a mistake. For if
the Golden Rule is linked to the vicissitudes of fortune-if we are supposed to treat
the less advantaged as we would want to be treated were we them-then we have to
explain how the unfortunate are supposed to treat the fortunate: why, that is, should
they treat the more fortunate as they would want to be treated themselves? The Nussbaum-Clinton interpretation of the Golden Rule leaves this question unanswered.
While it requires that the more advantaged show concern for the less advantaged,
because the more advantaged could have been (could imagine themselves to be) the
less advantaged, it appears to require no such concern, and offers no similar logic to
show why there should be such concern, in the opposite direction.

138 James Gould, The Golden Rule, 4 Am. J.
139 Id. at 78.

THEOLOGY

140

Id.

141
142
143

Id. at 75.
Id. at 74.
SeeJames A. Gould, The Not-So-Golden Rule, 1 SJ.

&

PHIL.

PHIL.

73, 76 (1983).

10, 12 (1963).

1562

NOTRE

DAME

[VOL. 84:4

LAW REVIEW

they were also generally of the view that it is impossible to demonstrate this impartiality so long as Golden Rule reasoning is understood
to be inherently bound up with particular human desires. How might
we disconnect the two things? The answer cannot be simply to recast
the Golden Rule as a principle of moral action the impartiality of
which is assumed by virtue of the fact that it requires us, in our treatment of others, to do good (and avoid bad) in accordance with our
own reading of a community's moral compass. Making such a reading, even if we feel capable of doing such a thing, leaves the Golden
Rule grounded in particular preferences and desires. Nor can we
answer the question satisfactorily by arguing, as Blackstone does, that
"[ i]f one interprets the .. .Golden Rule... as excluding.., egoism
or prudential concern,"'144 then it must be understood to be "a
metamoral rule"'145 which, though "itself morally ...

neutral," oper-

ates "as a guide to one's conduct" insofar as "[c] onformity to [it] constitutes a necessary condition for a judgment's being a moral
judgment.' 1 4 6 To argue thus is to neglect the fact that, sometimes, the

judgments we make are considered morally bad precisely because they
do not conform to the Golden Rule.
The case for a Golden Rule which is not connected to particular
desires has attracted at least three strong philosophical defenses.
Consider, first of all, the defense mounted by Marcus Singer. The
Golden Rule, according to Singer, can be interpreted as connected to
particular desires-what he indeed refers to as "the particularinterpretation" of the Rule. 147 On this interpretation, the Rule reads: "Do
unto others what you would have them do unto you.' 4 8 The particular interpretation, as we know already, is open to the objection that it
is essentially an excuse for imposing our tastes (our enjoyment of a
good argument, of having smoke blown in our faces, of the sound of
late-night street parties, and so on) on others. Fortunately, Singer
continues, the Golden Rule does not have to be interpreted thus. It is
also amenable to a "general interpretation" which might be phrased:
"Do unto others as you would have them do unto you."'1 49 On this
interpretation, recipients are entitled to expect agents to take account
of their interests, desires, needs, and wishes-which may well differ
from the agent's-and either satisfy those interests or else not willfully
144

W.T. Blackstone, The Golden Rule: A Defense, 3 SJ. PHIL. 172, 175 (1965)

(emphasis added).
145 Id. at 172.
146 Id. at 173.
147
148
149

Marcus G. Singer, The Golden Rule, 38 PHILOSOPHY 293, 299 (1963).
Id.
Id.
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frustrate them. 150 While treating others as you would have them treat
you does not mean having to treat them as if they shared your own
tastes, interests, and desires, in other words, it does mean treating
them according to "the same principle or standard" as you would have
them apply in their treatment of you. 151 The Golden Rule, on the
general interpretation, "requires A to act towards B on the same standard or principle that he would have B apply in his treatment of
him. ' 152 Although "the Golden Rule by itself does not unambiguously
and definitely determine just what these 'standards or principles'
should be, ... it does something towards determining this"1 5 3 because it
serves as "an instrument of moral education," 54 requiring the agent
not to "imagine [himself] to be another"I 55-this "'if I were he' sort of
thinking," Singer insists, "is not called for in the application of the
Golden Rule"156-but to think about what standard of treatment he
would want applied if he were the recipient.
Singer's claim that the general interpretation of the Golden Rule
does not require the agent to engage in "'if I were he' sort of thinking" seems wrong. In thinking about what standard of treatment I
would want applied if I were the recipient, I imagine myself in the
recipient's situation. When Singer himself tries to illustrate his argument-using the example of a judge sentencing a prisoner-he
makes the very maneuver he purports to eschew:
[T]he jailer, after thinking of himself in the position of the prisoner, should then apply the Rule to himself in this position, and
reflect that he, if he were the prisoner, should not try to escape,
because if he were the jailer he would not want the prisoner to

escape. 157
Singer's objective is to distinguish his position from that held by
Whately, discussed earlier, 58 who insists that application of the
Golden Rule presupposes on the part of the agent some understanding, derived from imagining oneself in the recipient's situation, of

150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

See id. at 300.
Id.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 313.
Id. at 310.
Id.
Id. at 311.
Id. at 312.
See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
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what is "fair, right, just, reasonable" treatment. 159 But the distinction
is not successfully made. Singer's general interpretation of the
Golden Rule requires agents to supply standards and principles of
treatment by imagining themselves as their recipients.
To distinguish the general and the particular interpretations of
the Golden Rule, Singer makes the words "what" and "as" do a considerable amount of work. It seems unlikely that many people would
derive such a crucial distinction from these two words-it is certainly
possible, for example, to find writers on the Golden Rule using "as"
when they clearly have in mind the particular interpretation.' 60 But if
one accepts that the distinction between the two interpretations is
genuine and important, it matters little, if at all, that its formulation is
made to turn merely on the replacement of one word with another. I
believe that the distinction is important. But I also think that the general interpretation of the Golden Rule is not as robust as Singer
believes it to be. We know that the particular interpretation authorizes someone who, for example, likes to argue and be argued with to
be quarrelsome towards others: I am permitted to do to you what I
would like you to do to me. But this cannot be the case, Singer insists,
on the general interpretation. On this interpretation the quarrelsome
person, "if he is to do as he would be done by, he must take account of
and (not ignore but) respect the wishes of people who do not like to
be provoked or to engage in quarrels, and restrict his quarrels to
' 61
those who, like him, enjoy them.'
I do not see why, on the general interpretation, this has to be the
case. Singer's quarrelsome person might claim that in quarreling with
another he is treating them as he would expect to be treated-according to the same standard he would expect to be applied to himself-in
the same situation. So it is that Xmight mercilessly criticize the scholarship of Y not because of a love of quarreling or animosity towards Y
but because X is applying a principle or standard-that scholarship is
a matter of seeking truth and exposing untruth, with no regard for
politics, personalities, fashion, and so on-and believes that not to
apply this principle or standard, to pull one's punches or look the
other way when there is committed an error such as that which has
been committed by Y, is to demean Yin particular (since his work is
treated superficially and dishonestly) and to do a disservice to scholar159 WHATELY, supra note 87, at 26 (emphases omitted); cf. Singer, supra note
147, at 309 ("[T]he Golden Rule is the source or at the basis of the Principle of

Justice....").
160 See, e.g., WEISS, supra note 73, at 139 (formulating the rule "as we would be
willing").
161 Singer, supra note 147, at 300.
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ship generally. When we treat others according to the same principles
or standards as we would have them apply in their treatment of us, our
treatment might well strike them as an oppressive imposition of our
tastes. But this does not mean that they should be shielded from such
treatment. The Golden Rule, as I tried to show in the first Part of this
Article, cannot be straightforwardly equated with charity, benevolence, or Good Samaritanism. Treating our recipients according to
the principles and standards we would have applied to us in the same
circumstances may occasionally require something akin to being cruel
to be kind (as might be the motive of, say, the parents who worked
their way through college and now refuse to pay off a child's debt).
Applying to our recipients standards of treatment lower than those we
would have applied to ourselves in the same circumstances, no matter
that our recipients might welcome such an application, may be to
treat them, and others, unfairly.
Alan Gewirth, the author of the second significant philosophical
defense of the Golden Rule that I want to consider, approves of
Singer's distinction between particular and general interpretations of
the Golden Rule. But Gewirth recognizes that the recipient faced
with the agent who claims to be following the Rule on its general
interpretation-who claims that his treatment of the recipient accords
with some standard or principle that, were he in the recipient's position, he would want applied to himself-might consider the agent's
treatment oppressive because the agent's principles and standards are
different from his own. 162 A possible way around this difficulty is to
interpret the Golden Rule according to its "spirit or intention," which,
Gewirth thinks, seems to be "mutualist or egalitarian" in that its appli163
This
cation should dissatisfy neither the agent nor the recipient.
interpretation of the Golden Rule-act in accordance with your recipient's desires as well as your own-Gewirth terms "the Generic
16 4
interpretation."
The Generic interpretation is beset by two difficulties. First, in
instances where the agent's and the recipient's desires conflict, it
"provides no guidance concerning how... accommodation or compromise is to proceed."1 65 Secondly, even when an agent does act in
accordance with his own desires as well as the recipient's, the resulting
action could still-as it was in R v. Brown 16 6 -be contrary to legal
162 See Alan Gewirth, The Golden Rule Rationalized, 3
134-45 (1978).
163 Id. at 136.
164 Id. (emphasis omitted).
165 Id. at 137.
166 See supra notes 118-29 and accompanying text.
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rules. But can we not accept that there are "certain standard desires
167
which all persons are normally thought to have for themselves,"
such as the desire not to have one's property stolen, the desire not to
be physically harmed, the desire not to be deceived, and so on? The
Golden Rule might be successfully defended against the accusation
that it allows us to impose our desires on others, in other words, if we
can demonstrate a distinction between specific desires of agents and
recipients and "standard" desires that are the basis for determining
the moral rightness of actions.
Gewirth thinks this is possible. The "difficulties of the Golden
Rule are to be resolved," he argues, "by adding the requirement that
the desires in question must be rational."'168 Thus amended, the
Golden Rule would read: "Do unto others as you would rationally
want them to do unto you." 169 It would be a serious error, he insists,
to interpret the term "rational" in a "normatively moral sense," as
Samuel Clarke does, and assume that the Golden Rule presupposes
some criterion of intrinsic reasonableness (or goodness) which
enables us to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate efforts to
follow it.170 For "[i]f criteria of reasonableness vary from one person
171
to another, then the problem of divergent 'tastes' is not resolved."'
Clarke, as we have seen, does not argue from the premise that reasonableness might vary thus; reasonableness he equates not with tastes
but with the pursuit of good and avoidance of evil. 172 For Gewirth-at
this point he claims that much the same criticism he is leveling at
Clarke can be leveled also at Augustine and Thomas Aquinasl' 7 3-such
a strategy fares no better than one which relativizes reasonableness,
for if "reasonable" is taken to have "some definite normative moral
sense,"' 74 we must already know what constitutes morally right action
before we follow the Golden Rule, and so "the Rule would no longer
be a first moral principle determining what are moral goods and
evils."1 7 5 There is no need to dwell on this criticism-that writers in
the natural law tradition cannot successfully defend the Golden Rule
as a first moral principle-since it is not essential to Gewirth's argument; he is simply trying to show the reader that his argument is dis167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175

Gewirth, supra note 162, at 137.
Id. at 137-38.
Id. at 138.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
See Gewirth, supra note 162, at 138-39.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 139.
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tinguishable from that of Clarke and others. But it should at least be
noted that his criticism is not so much wide of the mark as a shot at a
nonexistent target: within the natural law tradition, the Golden Rule
is generally understood to provide a degree of specificity to a first
moral principle-for Aquinas, the principle that one should love
one's neighbor as oneselft 76-rather than to be a first principle in its
own right.

Instead of interpreting the word "rational" in a normatively moral
sense, we do better, Gewirth argues, to interpret it "in a morally neutral sense."1 77 Such an interpretation, "which directly takes no sides
1 78
on the moral issue of how persons ought to treat one another,"
requires, in place of the particular wants and desires of agents and
recipients, a principle which will be intelligible and will appeal to both
recipient and agent equally. What could this principle be? A principle, Gewirth answers, which recognizes agents' and recipients' generic
rights-rights to freedom and well-being (such as the protection of
"life and physical integrity," prohibitions on "killing and physical
assault (except in self-defense) . . . lying, stealing, and promise-break-

ing," and children's need for "parental care"). 1 79 Formulated in
terms of the Golden Rule, the principle will read: "Do unto others as
you have a right that they do unto you. Or, to put it in its Generic
formulation: Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as
well as of yourself."18 0
The limitation of the Golden Rule to generic rights-based action
allows us to opt out of certain forms of virtuous behavior-charitable
giving, for example, or Good Samaritanism-because we have no right
to the same treatment from strangers. Although it is a mistake, as I
have already argued, to make no distinction between following the
Golden Rule and other forms of other-regarding benevolent action, it
will nevertheless be the case that such action is sometimes motivated
by Golden Rule reasoning: I did that for them (rescued them, made a
donation, etc.), even though I had no duty to do that for them,
because if I were in their situation I hope or expect someone would
do the same for me. Gewirth's formulation of the Golden Rule does
not accommodate those instances where an agent acts for the recipient not because he has a right to expect, but because he would appreciate, the same action from the recipient in similar circumstances.
176

See JOHN

FINNIs,

AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 126-28

(1998).
177

Gewirth, supra note 162, at 138.

178
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180

Id. at 139.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 139.
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Gewirth answers this objection by arguing that if the Golden Rule is
not restricted to claims regarding generic rights, "[i]f the agent were
to claim rights to whatever he might want ...

then not only would

there be a tremendous proliferation of right-claims, but the agent
would also be aware that he would be subject to an unmanageable
barrage of right-claims from other persons."18 1
For at least three reasons, this answer fails to meet the objection.
First, the objection is not based on Gewirth's assumption that the
recipient must have rights; rather, it is assumed-Gewirth has given us
no reason not to assume-that Golden Rule-motivated action may
have nothing whatsoever to do with what a recipient is entitled to as a
matter of right, generic or otherwise. Secondly, Gewirth makes no
philosophical case when he claims that "the agent must limit his
claims to . .. the generic rights."' 18 2 Rather, he makes a prudential
argument: an agent is well advised to do this so as "to avoid burdening
himself"' 18 3 with excessive duties to others. To argue that agents must
limit their Golden Rule following to generic rights-based actions
because otherwise they will have too much to do is to make no case at
all for limiting such Rule-following to these actions in particular.
Finally, note the scenario Gewirth envisages if the Golden Rule is not
restricted thus: the agent will be able "to claim rights to whatever he
might want.' 1 8

4

Abandoning the restriction of the Golden Rule to

generic rights-based actions does not mean that there cannot be any
other forms of restriction on the types of action that can qualify as
action suitable to following the Golden Rule. And even if it is
accepted that an agent's claims should not be unrestricted, this is not
in itself a reason for saying that such claims should be restricted to
185
those involving generic rights.

181

Id. at 143.

182
183
184

Id.
Id.
Id.

185 If it is accepted that such claims should be so restricted, there arises the problem of how the Golden Rule ought to operate in those instances where there are
"conflicts between -the generic rights of the agent and of his recipients." Id. at 144.
Again, Gewirth's principal response is not philosophical argument but a prudential

assertion about quantity-"such conflicts are far fewer than the conflicts among
desires taken indiscriminately," id-as if we might dispense with the problem simply
by observing that it does not arise very often. Insofar as Gewirth does try to tackle the
problem philosophically, his answer is that claims regarding generic rights-rights
which, "[i]f some agent were to deny that he has [them], he would contradict himself," id. at 139-might be ranked in terms of their relative necessity for action:

[T]he fact that the generic rights are derived from the necessary conditions
of agency provides a rational basis for resolving conflicts among specific
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The last of the philosophical defenses of the Golden Rule that I
want to consider at this point is, I think, the most subtle and intriguing. The defense is, in this instance, bound up with a broader argument: Richard Hare's thesis-a logical rather than a moral thesis18 6
that moral judgments are universalizable prescriptive judgments.
Consider, first of all, the notion of prescriptivity. For Hare, it is in the
character of a moral principle that we would prescribe it for ourselves
(even if we were, or if we imagine ourselves, in someone else's shoes).
But if moral judgments are prescriptive, how can one accept any such
judgment and act contrary to it? Prescriptivism has to contend with
weakness of the will-with the fact, as Hare memorably puts it, that we
are wont to take moral holidays. 187 I know I ought to (and could) be
more charitable, and spend more time with my children, but I don't; I
know I ought not (and need not) take a shortcut across the grass, but
now and again I do. "[O]ught" seems to be a 'Janus-word" which
"can... look in the direction that suits its user's interests, and bury its
other face in the sand."18 8 Sometimes, having said "that we ought to
be doing" something (and having intended to do that thing) but having failed to do it owing to weakness of will (a failure of "moral
strength," as Hare puts it), we "still go on saying that we thought that
we ought" to do whatever it is we failed to do without changing the
meaning of "ought" as we have been using it all along. 189
How can prescriptivism rise to this problem? When we say (with
sincerity) that we ought to act in a particular way and then fail to carry
out the act, Hare answers, the problem is not that we will not but that
"[i]n a deeper sense" we "cannot do the act."' 190 Obsessive-compulsive
behavior-where one recognizes that one ought to be relaxed, but
cannot be relaxed, about, say, stepping on cracks in pavements or
touching door handles-seems to be what Hare principally has in
mind. 9 1 It seems odd to characterize such behavior as weakness of
the will or failure of moral strength. Likewise it seems strange to conrights. For, other things being equal, one right takes precedence over
another to the degree to which the former is more necessary for action than
is the latter. For example, A's right not to be killed takes precedence over
B's right to be told the truth when the two are in conflict ...
Id. at 144-45.
186 See HARE, supra note 86, at 30, 35, 192.
187 See R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING 57-60 (1981) (discussing the problem of
"weakness of will").
188 HARE, supra note 86, at 75-76.
189 Id. at 76.
190 Id. at 82.
191 See id. (discussing "compulsive neuroses").
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clude that when we, for example, say that we ought, but we nevertheless fail, not to walk across the grass, then we must always be engaging
in "purposive backsliding, or hypocrisy," that this cannot ever be a
case of weakness of the will because the requisite will-the genuine
intention to do what we say we ought to do or have done-is not actually present. 192 Such a conclusion seems to require conjecture regarding our capacity for self-deception. We might easily and reasonably
speculate that in such an instance genuine intention could sometimes
be present, that I might say, sincerely, that I ought not to cut across
the grass, and I could intend not to do so, right up to the point when
some other moral requirement (I ought to-anyone in my position
ought to-get to this meeting on time) eclipsed it.
Hare's argument regarding the universalizability of moral judgments matters more for our purposes than does his claim that such
judgments are prescriptive. Of "any singular descriptive judgement"
we might say-Hare considers the proposition "unobjectionable"that it is "universalizable" in the sense that "anything exactly like the
subject of the ... judgement, or like it in the relevant respects," must

be judged in the same way. 193 My description of the tomato as red
commits me to describing all other tomatoes that are like it, or like it
in relevant respects, as red; that there may be tomatoes that I describe
as, say, green is attributable to the fact that these (unripe) tomatoes
are recognizably different from the red ones. Formulated in terms of
descriptive judgments, the thesis-we describe the things that appear
alike as alike and things that appear different as different-is, Hare
194
concedes, "quite trivial."
The thesis becomes more interesting and powerful, however,
when we employ it in moral argument. A "moral principle," according to Hare, "has got to be universal."' 19 5 Anyone who considers a certain action morally right or wrong is thereby committed to taking the
same view of any other relevantly similar action: "to make different
moral judgements about actions which we admit to be exactly or relevantly similar" is to be self-contradictory. 196 If it is wrong for me to act
in a certain way in particular circumstances, then in those circumstances, or relevantly similar ones, it should be wrong for anyone else
to act in that way. It is in the nature of moral prescriptions, in other
words, that they are universalizable.
192
193
194
195
196

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

82-83.
12.
46-47.
33.
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Universalizability is the test for whether any proposed action is
morally acceptable to us. 197 "[I] n facing moral questions ... as questions of moral principle" we must ask ourselves: "' [t] o what action can
I commit myself in this situation, realizing that, in committing myself
to it, I am also (because the judgment is a universalizable one) prescribing to anyone in a like situation to do the same' "?198 The Golden
Rule, though it is not to "be confused with the thesis of universalizability," 19 9 can be interpreted as a universalized prescription: to prescribe "treat others as you would have them treat you" is to say that we
should only act as we would have others act in essentially the same
situation. Note that Hare's version of the Golden Rule is necessarily
couched in the imperative. 200 A conditionally formulated Golden
Rule-treat others as we would like them to treat us-would require
that we treat others as we would like to be treated in situations where
we are in another's position with that other's likes and dislikes: the

197 See id. at 90. The action does not have to be taken. The test, rather, is whether
the action is acceptable to us ex hypothesi. See id. at 93-94.
198 Id. at 47-48; accord id. at 199. Note that this does not mean that we must always
be passing judgment on others. Leaving aside the fact that it is normally tactful to
keep one's opinions to oneself, it is also the case that "we cannot know everything
about another actual person's concrete situation" and so cannot presume that their
situation is similar to ours. Id. at 49. A similar argument is advanced by John Finnis
when he observes that it is transparent to any particular person how his or her choices
impact his or her character, but it is not transparent to that person how other people's choices relate to their characters. I may dislike what someone chooses to do, but
since the grounds for the choice(s) are unclear to me, this is no reason to condemn
(the character of) that person. See JOHN FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS 140-42
(1983); J.M. Finnis, Legal Enforcement of "Duties to Oneself' Kant v. Neo-Kantians, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 433, 438 n.21 (1987). The problem of transparency becomes obvious
when we consider the case of treating someone harshly because we believe that this is
what they deserve. We might try to justify such behavior on the basis of the Golden
Rule: such treatment is deserved because, were it us in their position, it is essentially
the treatment that we think we would deserve. But of course it is not us but them in
their position, and without insight into what has motivated their action we cannot
truly make ajudgment of them or their character. All we can do is judge their action.
This insight is crucial, I think, to understanding why liberalism does not require a
commitment to neutrality as between conceptions of the good (a point to which I
return later). See infra notes 326-35 and accompanying text.
199 HARE, supra note 86, at 34.
200 A case has to be made for couching the Golden Rule in the imperative, Hare
appreciates, and he tries to show that, in the biblical context, the case can be made.
See R.M. Hare, Euthanasia:A Christian View, PHILOSOPHIC EXCHANGE, Summer 1975, at
43, 44. The case that he makes receives some exegetical support in Georg Strecker,
Compliance-Love of One's Enemy-The Golden Rule, 29 AusTL. BIBLICAL REV. 38, 44
(1981).
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prescription could only be accepted for universal application if every-

body had the same preferences.
Since we differ in our preferences, what can it mean to say that
we should treat others as we would have them treat us? If "others" is
taken to mean "others as imagined with our preferences," then the
Golden Rule is: "treat others as we would want to be treated." The
poverty of Golden Rule reasoning understood as an imaginative act
performed from our own perspective is obvious if we consider such
reasoning in the context of jury instruction. Isocrates, in one his
forensic speeches, pleads for the jury "to give ajust verdict, and prove
yourselves to be for me such judges as you would want to have for
yourselves." 20 1 But if a jury was able to place itself in my, or my client's, shoes and ask what it would then want, its answer would not
necessarily make for a just verdict. Many an instance can be found in
U.S. federal case law of courts, particularly in cases where jurors determine the levels of damages awards, ruling it improper for counsel to
ask jurors to try to imagine what they would want were they, or one of
202
their loved ones, in their client's (usually the plaintiff's) shoes.
Golden Rule reasoning is not completely ruled out in such instances.
Such reasoning is often considered permissible, for example, where
counsel's question to the jury is framed not in terms of desire ("How
much would you want awarded if this had happened to you, or someone close to you?") but in terms of reasonable action ("Had you been
in the plaintiffs position, knowing the floor was still wet, would you
have run across it?"),203 and even if it is considered improper, it might
still not be declared a reversible error necessitating a retrial if the jury
receives clear instruction from the judge that the argument must be
disregarded, 20 4 if the argument is withdrawn by counsel, 20 5 if it is clear
from the modesty or reasonableness of the damages award that the
201 IsocRATEs, Aegineticus, at verses 50-51 (c. 394 BC), reprinted in 3 IsocRATEs 297,
329 (LaRue Van Hook trans., 1945).
202 See generally Kevin W. Brown, Annotation, Propriety and PrejudicialEffect of Attorney's "Golden Rule" Argument to Jury in Federal Civil Case, 68 A.L.R. FED. 333 (1984 &
2006 supp.) (discussing the use of "Golden rule" arguments in federal civil cases); L.S.
Tellier, Annotation, Taking Position of Litigant, 70 A.L.Rj2d 935 (1960) (discussing
varying rules concerning "Golden Rule" arguments in state and federal courts).
203 See, e.g., Johnson v. Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281, 1289 (2d Cir. 1990) (agreeing with the court below that a "Golden Rule argument related to liability only" was
not improper); Stokes v. Delcambre, 710 F.2d 1120, 1128 (5th Cir. 1983) (same);
Duerden v. PBR Offshore Marine Corp., 471 So. 2d 1111, 1114 (La. Ct. App. 1985)

(same).
204 See, e.g., Young v. Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A., 617 So. 2d 517, 535 (La. Ct.
App. 1993) (considering, as evidence against assignment of error, the judge's instruc-

tion that Golden Rule statements of counsel were not evidence).
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jury was not moved by the argument,2 0 6 or if a court decides that it
can offset the prejudicial effect of the argument by reducing the
amount of damages awarded by thejury.2 0 7 But in U.S. civil litigation,
Golden Rule reasoning more often than not is considered prejudicial,
primarily because the imaginative leap that jurors are being asked to
make compromises their impartiality-they are trying to put themselves in the position of one party and not the other-and has them
focus on their emotions rather than on the trial evidence. 20 8 Following the Golden Rule is likely to militate against, rather than facilitate,
the achievement of fairness, so the argument goes, if "treat others" is
interpreted to mean "treat others as imagined with our preferences."
So, how else might we interpret "others"? The obvious answer is:
"others as imagined with their own preferences." While I might be
able to imagine what I would feel were I you in these circumstances,
and even, recalling my own reactions in a similar situation, what you
must feel, I cannot know what you feel, for I cannot be you. 20 9 There
will be instances, furthermore, when I think I know how I would want
to be treated were I in your circumstances but, having never exper205 See, e.g., Tex. & N.O. Ry. Co. v. New, 95 S.W.2d 170, 176 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936)
(holding that counsel for defendant had a "duty" to ask for withdrawal of the Golden
Rule argument); Duchaine v. Ray, 6 A.2d 28, 32 (Vt. 1939) (ruling that withdrawal
and charge were "sufficient to cure whatever mischief' lay in the Golden Rule argument by plaintiff).
206 See, e.g., Bates v. Kitchel, 132 N.W. 459, 461 (Mich. 1911) (refusing to set aside
judgment because it was plainly not the result of prejudice, despite the Golden Rule
argument); Crosswhite v. Barnes, 124 S.E. 242, 247 (Va. 1924) (same).
207 Cf Johnson v. Stotts, 101 N.E.2d 880, 883 (Ill. App. Ct. 1951) (reducing damages to offset other types of prejudicial remarks).
208 See, e.g.,
Ivy v. Sec. Barge Lines, Inc., 585 F.2d 732, 741 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[The
Golden Rule] argument is ...improper because it encourages the jury to depart from
neutrality and to decide the case on the basis of personal interest and bias ...."
(footnote omitted)); Johnson v. Colglazier, 348 F.2d 420, 424-25 (5th Cir. 1965)
(objecting to the "illusion of certainty" the Golden Rule arguments create); Klotz v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 267 F.2d 53, 54-55 (7th Cir. 1959) (characterizing the Golden
Rule argument as an illegitimate "appeal to sympathy"); Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Kelly,
84 F.2d 569, 576 (8th Cir. 1936) (placing jurors in the position of plaintiff's family
"disqualifie[s] them asjurors").
209 See C.C.W. Taylor, Book Review, 74 MIND 280, 288-90 (1965) (reviewing HARE,
supra note 86) ("[I]magining that one is some person other than the person one in
fact is .... is logically impossible for anyone not suffering from delusions about his

identity .... [Yet the whole point of] Hare's insistence that his opponent must be
made to pronounce in prop-ia persona an imperative with respect to a hypothetical
situation in which he is himself the victim ... is to ensure that the person issuing the
imperative and the victim of the action enjoined by the imperative are the same person, since only thus can we conclude that the opponent has a reason for desisting
from his proposed action.").
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ienced or even thought about similar circumstances, would be rash to
purport to know how you will want to be treated. Singer, we saw,
made light of this difficulty, insisting that Golden Rule reasoning does
not require "if I were he" thinking. But we also saw that Singer could
not avoid formulating such reasoning in terms of the agent having to
think of himself as if he were the recipient. 2 10 For Hare, the Golden
Rule, understood as a universalized prescription, requires the agent to
ask himself not "how would you like it if this was done to you?" but
" [w] hat do you say... about a hypothetical case in which you are in
your victim's position?" 21 1 The common philosophical objection to
this formulation is that the person in the hypothesized position (the
victim) and the person legislating for it (you) are different people
with different, possibly radically different, values and preferences, and
so, if it is possible for you to make the imaginative leap, to put yourself
in your victim's shoes, it is not clear what, if anything, of you will be
retained once you have put yourself there. 21 2 A particularly clear illustration of the problem can be found in Harsanyi's attempt, considered earlier, 2 13 to show how following the Golden Rule in such a way
as to maximize average utility requires that I make "interpersonal"
comparisons by imagining myself as different people living in societies
with different policies:
Simple reflection will show that the basic intellectual operation in
such interpersonal comparisons is imaginative empathy. We imagine ourselves to be in the shoes of another person, and ask ourselves
the question, "If I were now really in his position, and had his taste,
his education, his social background, his cultural values, and his psychological make-up, then what would now be my preferences
between various alternatives, and how much satisfaction or dissatis2 14
faction would I derive from any given alternative?"
210 See supra notes 147-57 and accompanying text.
211 HARE, supra note 86, at 108.
212 See, e.g., MACKIE, supra note 99, at 92-93 (describing how, if one tries to put
oneself "into the other person's place ....hardly any of oneself is retained"); Taylor,
supra note 209, at 286-88 ("[The argument that a person] should be obliged to assent
inproia persona to an imperative prescribing that a certain action be done to him,
given that he is in the same position as the victim of the action... depend[s] on the
assumption that the person in the hypothetical situation [and the victim] should be
the same person, in order that that person should find himself obliged to prescribe for
himself something which he does not want."); cf. HARE, supra note 187, at 119-21
(offering a brief defense of his position to the effect that putting yourself in someone
else's shoes requires only the supposition that you lose your set of properties and
acquire another's).
213 See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
214 Harsanyi, supra note 90, at 638.
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All I can do is imagine satisfying these conditions. I cannot satisfy
them. 21 5 Asking myself what my preferences would be if I had somebody else's ideals, properties, tastes, and so on is rather like hoping to
discover how weightlessness feels by imagining myself as an astronaut
in space. The main problem with interpreting "others" to mean
"others with our preferences" is that it excuses our imposing our tastes
on others in the name of following the Golden Rule. The main problem with interpreting "others" to mean "others with their preferences"
is that it is not clear how we might speak meaningfully of our putting
ourselves in the position of others with their preferences. But what
other plausible interpretations might there be?
One possibility is to negate, or at least minimize the significance
of, preferences. Rawls' original position provides perhaps the most
obvious example of negation: deciding on principles ofjustice behind
a veil of ignorance requires that we act without knowing our social
status and position, our natural assets and abilities, and our conceptions of the good or psychological propensities, the assumption being
that ignorance of these details about ourselves will lead us to treat
others as we would want to be treated were we to discover, on the veil's
being lifted, that we were among the least well-off in society.2 16 But all
this amounts to is a formulation of the Golden Rule in Rawlsian
terms-treat others as you would have them treat you if it transpired
that you were among the least advantaged. Reasoning from a hypothetical original position provides us with no insight into Golden Rule
following as an actual human activity because when we do apply the
Golden Rule we are not unaware of our preferences. Harsanyi, in his
attempt to show not how parties without advance knowledge of their
social position will settle on principles ofjustice but how they will seek
to maximize average utility, minimizes the significance of preferences-not by trying to assume them away but by postulating that base
preferences do not differ very much from one person to the next:
"[O]nce proper allowances have been made for ... empirically given

differences in taste, education, etc., between me and another person,
then it is reasonable for me to assume that our basic, psychological
reactions to any given alternative will be ...much the same." 2 17 This

"similarity postulate" 218 makes "treating others as I imagine them with
my preferences" and "treating others as I imagine them with their own

215 See Alfred F. MacKay, Extended Sympathy and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons, 83
J. PHIL. 305, 318-19 (1986).
216 SeeJOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 102-60 (rev. ed. 1999).
217 Harsanyi, supra note 90, at 639.

218

Id.

1576

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

84:4

preferences" barely distinguishable propositions, for it requires me to
suppose that recipients of my treatment have "much the same" reaction-relevant characteristics as I do. If I do suppose this, I may as well
follow the Golden Rule on the basis of my own "psychological reactions" to given alternatives. The similarity postulate provides us with a
reason for assuming imaginative empathy to be of no great
219
importance.
We would do better, I think, not to negate or minimize the significance of preferences, nor to try to follow the Golden Rule only by
reference to what we would want or by reference to what we imagine
the recipient would want, but rather to try to discover reasons for
action by considering both our own and what we imagine to be the
recipient's perspective. When Golden Rule reasoning amounts to a
sincere effort to consider matters from both these perspectives, Hobbes believed, the possibility of agents acting selfishly is banished:
"when weighing the actions of other men with his own," that is, the
follower of the Golden Rule discovers "that his own passions, and
selfe-love may adde nothing to the weight." 220 This argument-essentially an extension of Hobbes' claim (considered earlier) 22 1 that the
Golden Rule inclines us to behave moderately rather than oppressively-is simplistic. And of course trying to imagine our recipient's
perspective does not mean that we can know that perspective. I do
not think we should conclude from either of these observations, however, that empathetic identification must always be either impossible
or pointless. Although we cannot be our recipients, and although we
cannot know just how much of ourselves we would have to put into
our recipient's shoes in order to identify with them, we may be able to
imagine and identify with some of their experiences or predicaments
(just as we are able to do with fictional characters). And while the
effort at imagination will not be actual experience, it will sometimes
enable us to make a reasonable guess at what a recipient would consider appropriate treatment in particular situations.
We know, of course, that the human capacity for considering all
manners of treatment, even inhuman treatment, to be appropriate
can sometimes make Golden Rule reasoning seem perverse. Hare
asks us to consider the "fanatic[]" who is willing to endure the displeasure he is keen to impose. 222 For most people, universal prescriptivism will reveal the intolerability of fanaticism, for it shows that we
219
220
221
222

See MacKay, supra note 215, at 322.
HOBBES, supra note 70, at 215.
See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
-RE,

supra note 86, at 112.
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should not pursue actions which we would have others, in like
instances, desist from pursuing. We have to ask ourselves, that is,
whether we would be prepared to prescribe that our own inclinations
be disregarded in the way that we are disregarding our neighbor's.
That we might be so prepared, even when the consequences are the
worst imaginable, is not inconceivable. The Nazi who desires that all
Jews be exterminated might just discover that he is a Jew. By universalizing his moral judgment in this instance, he reveals his extreme
fanaticism: as Hare puts it, "nobody but a madman would hold" that,
on this discovery, they too should be sent to the gas chambers. 22 3 Yet,
Hare concedes such fanatics may well exist, and "golden-rule arguments seem powerless '224 against them insofar as they can provide,
say, the Nazi who discovers he is ajew with no reason not-we might,
indeed, say that they provide him with the reason-"to immolate him'2 25
self at the service of his ideal.
Hare's universal-prescriptivist defense of Golden Rule reasoning
is, he readily concedes, "of a more or less Kantian sort."2 26 The
defense requires us to recognize that such reasoning will often be
multilateral (we are, after all, universalizing our judgments with
respect to all others affected by them), and that in the multilateral
scenario the agent will have to decide to which "other" his duty is
owed. The decision demands of us, Hare thinks, a mixture of imagination and (preference) utilitarianism. 2 27 It is hardly surprising that a
moral philosophy that embraces elements of Kantianism and utilitarianism and defends Golden Rule reasoning (which, remember, Kant
dismissed as trivial) should have been the subject of an immense
amount of philosophical debate. 228 The general debate-whether
universalizability is a very different concept in Hare's philosophy than
it is in Kant's, whether Hare successfully demonstrates the compatibility of universal prescriptivism and utilitarianism, and so on-has to be
left to one side. Suffice it to say for our purposes that Hare wants us to
consider the type of moral reasoning that he recommends as an exercise in moral exploration. 229 Most people-leave aside the genuine
fanatic-are prevented from accepting certain moral judgments
because those judgments entail logical consequences which they can223 Id. at 172; accord id. at 220-21.
224 Id. at 175.
225 Id. at 192.
226 R.M. Hare, A KantianApproach to Abortion, 15 Soc. THEORY & PRAc. 1, 5 (1989).
227 See HARE, supra note 86, at 123.
228 See, e.g., HARE AND CRITICS: ESSAYS ON MORAL THINKING 3-8 (Douglas Seanor &
N. Fotion eds., 1988).
229

See HARE, supra note 86, at 193.
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not accept. Unless we are prepared to disregard anyone's desires,
even our own, we are compelled to give weight to the desires of our
neighbors. So it is, for Hare, that toleration "is the logical consequence of universalizability, when coupled with prescriptivity.

'2 30

Our

capacity to imagine the predicament of another "as if it were going
really to happen to us" means that we can think about pains, injuries,
deprivations, and so on in terms of what they would mean for us in a
"hypothetical similar situation. '2

31

It is precisely this capacity that

stops most of us from becoming fanatics.
IV.

FOLLOWING THE GOLDEN RULE: ASSISTANCE AND ABORTION

The Golden Rule could never successfully be put to the service of
all moral theorizing. There are, as Hare observes, some moral questions-questions that, though they might involve consideration of
others, are essentially about ourselves and what sort of people we want
232
to be-to which Golden Rule reasoning cannot supply answers.
What should be clear, nevertheless, is that universal prescriptivism
makes it reasonable to conclude that the Golden Rule is a principle of
moral action which requires that agents do more than merely project
their own values and desires onto others. This is neither to claim that
the principle nor the moral reasoning in which it is being grounded is
unassailable: I hope that my outline of universal prescriptivism has
been sufficiently detailed to show that it is not an easy philosophy to
defend, and that even Hare recognizes that it does not explain the
moral wrongness of genuine and consistent fanaticism. 233 It is to

claim, however, that universal prescriptivism has provided us with a
conception of the Golden Rule sufficiently robust to be worth putting
to the test. Let us consider the Golden Rule interpreted as a universal
prescription in relation to two ethical problems.
A.

Assistance

I have argued already that following the Golden Rule is distinguishable from Good Samaritanism. A separate question is whether
the Golden Rule compels Good Samaritanism when a potential recipi230 Id. at 195; accord id. at 198.
231 Id. at 197.
232 See id. at 138-50.
233 Hare came to argue that only a "pure" fanatic who is able consistently to hold
his position even after reflecting critically on it and recognizing its inconsistency with
rational choice presents a difficulty for universal prescriptivism, and that such a
fanatic, though logically conceivable, never exists in reality. See HARE, supranote 187,
at 169-87.
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ent is in need. Academic lawyers sometimes express dismay over the
absence from the common law of a general duty to rescue. 234 In civilian systems, such a duty is often set down in the national penal code.
But the common law limits the duty to special relationships (parents
to children, police officers to the public, and so on). It is difficult to
say why this should be the case. Possibly the need to establish a general duty to rescue has been somewhat diminished given that the
range of special duties has been regularly extended and that courts
and (particularly) legislatures have been effective in encouraging vari235
ous forms of supererogatory action.
Does Golden Rule reasoning support the creation of a general
duty to rescue? If we try to imagine ourselves in the position of the
person needing to be assisted or rescued in a situation in which his
well-being or life is under threat and ask ourselves what we would want
done for us in that position, our answer will probably be that we would
want somebody to step in and help. But this should not lead us to
deduce that there must be a duty for somebody to step in and help.
Sometimes we will contemplate the suffering of others and conclude
that, were our positions reversed, we would not consider them obliged
to try to alleviate our suffering-because, for example, of the very
strong likelihood that their intervention would result in their deathnotwithstanding our aversion to suffering thus. It is tempting to think
also that our decision as to how to treat the imperiled depends on
whether they are physically remote. 236 The distance between potential rescuers and imperiled strangers is morally significant: faced with
a choice between intervening in two cases which are identical on the
facts apart from that in the first case imperilment is physically close
234 The literature is vast. See, e.g., Charles 0. Gregory, The Good Samaritan and the
Bad: The Anglo-American Law, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 23, 23-41 (James
M. Ratcliffe ed., 1966); Kathleen M. Ridolfi, Law, Ethics, and the Good Samaritan:Should
There Be a Duty to Rescue?, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 957, 959-60 (2000) (concerning
questions central to the duty to rescue debate); ErnestJ. Weinrib, The Casefor a Duty to
Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 249-51 (1980) (sketching and responding to criticisms of the
duty to rescue principle).
235 On encouragement, see for example, Hanoch Dagan, In Defense of the Good
Samaritan,97 MICH. L. REv. 1152 (1999) (arguing that the law should "relinquish the
traditional reluctance that typifies the law's treatment of good samaritan claims");
Antony M. Honor6, Law, Morals and Rescue, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW,
supra note 234, at 225, 232-45.
236 See Thomas L. Haskell, Capitalism and the Origins of the HumanitarianSensibility,
Part 1, 90 Am. HIsT. REv. 339, 354-59 (1985) (arguing that the breaking down of
distances-owing to the emergence, for example, of a new technology that makes
what was once remote part of our everyday realm-will alter an individual's sense of
responsibility to others).

1580

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 84:4

and in the second it is not, people are likely to feel a greater responsibility to intervene in the first case rather than the second. 237 But in
the case of Golden Rule reasoning and the notion of a general duty to
rescue, our failure to assist the imperiled but remote will usually be
attributable not to our greater sense of responsibility to someone or
some group imperiled but closer to home, but to our understanding
that, irrespective of proximity, we cannot be held responsible for all of
the consequences which we foresee will result from the choices we
make. I may well know the likely consequences of choices I make, but
it is "characteristic of very bad degenerations of thought," as Elizabeth
Anscombe put it, to say that because I foresee those consequences I
must therefore intend and be responsible for all of them. 238 When I

follow the Golden Rule close to home I may be rescuing nobody: it
has certainly not escaped my attention that all that time refereeing
manuscripts, writing references, looking after the neighbor's cats, and
so on could have been spent working for the Samaritans, trying to save
Brazilian street children, distributing food parcels in Ethiopia, or on
many other rescue projects near and far. But I think it would be
wrong to conclude (though it seems some moral philosophers would
conclude) 239 that my choosing to follow the Golden Rule in the ways
that I do makes me responsible for the suffering and deaths of many
people both at home and abroad.
It is quite often assumed that the principal reason there is no
general duty to rescue at common law is that it is difficult to specify
the circumstances in which such a duty should arise. "It is... difficult
to find the boundaries of the duty," one civil lawyer has observed,
"and therefore it is difficult for potential rescuers to know whether
240
they have to intervene and if so, when their duty to assist ends."
This problem is no doubt real. However, if the fact that a legal principle is vague were a sufficient ground for repudiating it, there wouldcertainly in the common law-be very few principles. The more serious problem, according to Ernest Weinrib, is whether the indetermi237 See F.M. Kamm, Does Distance Matter Morally to the Duty to Rescue?, 19 L. & PHIL.
655, 656 (2000).
238 G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, 33 PHILosoPHY 1, 11 (1958).
239 See, e.g., John Harris, The PhilosophicalCase Against the PhilosophicalCase Against
Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED 36, 40 (John Keown ed., 1995) ("For me the
agent chooses the world which she voluntarily creates, the world which she could have
chosen not to create or to create differently, the world which results from her actions
(or conscious omissions). I believe that we are responsible for the whole package of
consequences which we know will result from the choices we make.").
240 JAN M. SMITS, THE GOOD SAMARITAN IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 30 (2000).
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nacy of a rescue principle is legally manageable. 24 1 But manageability
may be a problem even in what seem to be the most uncontroversial
rescue cases. Consider a principle-one which Weinrib favors 242which only obliges potential rescuers to come to the aid of the imperiled when it is easy for them to do so. "It would be unreasonable to
reject a principle," Scanlon argues, which holds that "if you are
presented with a situation in which you can prevent something very
bad from happening, or alleviate someone's dire plight, by making a
slight (or even moderate) sacrifice, then it would be wrong not to do
so."243 The difficulty with this principle of "easy rescue" conceived as
a legal principle is not so much its vagueness as its enforceability. The
strongest swimmers at the beach are the ones who should be able to
save the plight of the drowning child by making only a slight or moderate sacrifice. But if, for whatever reason, the strongest swimmers do
not reveal their hands, it will probably be impossible to show that anyone is in breach of their legal duty.
In some circumstances we take the view that although it would be
wrong never to provide assistance, it would be unreasonable to say
that we are morally bound always to provide assistance: I would have
felt bad had I not put money in one of the various charity collector's
boxes as I walked down the high street, but I did not feel bad for not
putting money in all of them, notwithstanding that I considered all of
the charities equally deserving. To say that if I ought to assist in case A
then I ought to assist in all cases that I consider materially similar to
case A as well is to cast the moral net too wide. Jeremy Waldron puts
the point in Kantian terms: a general duty to rescue cannot be a perfect duty. 2 4 4 For our purposes, the point worth emphasizing is at the
heart of John Mackie's critique of Hare: that even when universal
prescriptivism does require a particular action, it will not be "the logic
of 'ought' alone" but also the many subjective elements in our reasoning that determine what we do. 245 The point can be formulated in
terms of the Golden Rule: in many instances-giving to beggars, giving way to other drivers trying to get onto busy roads, and so on-we
may be able to help and may appreciate that, were we in the recipient's shoes, we would appreciate the help, yet, having universalized
the moral judgment, we still might feel no compulsion to help in
every such instance we encounter.
241 See Weinrib, supra note 234, at 275.
242 See id. at 268-92.
243 T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OwE TO EACH
244

OTHER

224 (1998).

See Jeremy Waldron, On the Road: Good Samaritans and Compelling Duties, 40
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1053, 1071-72 (2000).
245 See MACKIE, supra note 99, at 99-102.
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Hare himself offers a characteristically unique perspective on the
duty to assist ("rescue" would be the wrong word to use in relation to
the problem with which he presents us). In a short essay written in
the early 1970s, he offers the "unusual case . . . which did actually

happen some time ago and was reported in the press" of a "driver of a
petrol lorry" whose "tanker overturned and immediately caught
fire." 24 6 The driver "was trapped in the cab and could not be freed.

He therefore besought the bystanders to kill him by hitting him on
the head, so that he would not roast to death." 247 ("I think that some-

body did this," Hare adds, "but I do not know what happened in court
afterwards.") 248 If you accept that you should do to others what you
wish that they should do to you, and if you "ask yourselves .

.

. what

you [would] wish that men should do to you if you were in the situation of that driver," Hare conjectures, "I cannot believe that anybody
who considered the matter seriously ... would say that the rule should
be one ruling out euthanasia absolutely." 249 Application of the
Golden Rule (conceived as a universal prescription) will not, in other
words, lead us to the conclusion "that euthanasia is always and abso250
lutely wrong."
The incident which Hare had in mind took place in September
1959, more than a decade before he wrote about it, so it is understandable that he should have been unsure as to the facts and what
was decided in court. Yet the facts provide us with reason to be somewhat skeptical about Hare's argument. According to the report in The
Times, when the lorry's engine caught fire and its cabin was engulfed
with flames and fumes, the driver-who, it is reported, despite the
extremity of the situation "remained very calm"-asked bystanders
not to kill him but to render him unconscious. The coroner concluded not only that the blow delivered to the driver could not have
caused death in a man of the driver's build, but that the bystander
who delivered it only intended the driver to lose consciousness. Notwithstanding that the intervention was risky and dangerous, undertaken "in the stress of the moment and on ...

impulse," it seemed to

be motivated by a desire "to cause unconsciousness [in the driver] at
the very last moment when it was felt that there was nothing further

246
247
248
249
250

Hare, supra note 200, at 45.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that could be done." The jury returned a verdict of accidental
25
death. '
Hare's conception of euthanasia-deliberately killing a person
out of kindness-is perfectly valid. 252 But note that it is not the nowa-

days more common understanding of the term, according to which it
is presumed that the killer has some special responsibility to the person (or animal) to be killed.2

53

Since, both in Hare's and in the

reported version of events, the bystander appears not to have been a
doctor and did not know the sufferer, any conclusion drawn from
either version is best treated as a conclusion about the morality of
mercy killing simpliciter rather than mercy killing as, say, a medical
intervention. The newspaper report of the event is, I think, morally
more interesting than is Hare's example and his interpretation of it.
If we ask ourselves what we would wish that someone would do to us if
we found ourselves in the situation of the driver, we would no doubt
wish, as the driver did wish, for an end to our suffering. No doubt we
would want a bystander to try to take action which might alleviate our
suffering rather than just leave us to die. But this does not mean that
we would wish, indeed it seems unlikely that we would wish, for a
bystander to end our life. The point is not so much that we might
hope for some sort of last-minute reprieve-the arrival of the emergency services, the sudden unwedging of a door, or whatever-as that
we recognize, whatever our particular values and preferences, the
unreasonableness of asking a bystander to make this choice. It is precisely by applying the Golden Rule here that we come to grasp that it
is not a basic moral principle: to ask what we would wish that another
would do to us if we found ourselves in a similar situation is to ask
what we could and could not reasonably request another person to do
in such a situation. Hare applied the Golden Rule to the lorry driver's
plight to demonstrate "a very limited and negative conclusion"-that
euthanasia

cannot always be

wrong.2 54

I cannot see

that he

succeeded.
B.

Abortion

Assistance-based arguments sometimes find their way into
debates about abortion. Linda McClain has argued, for example, that
251 For all of this information and all the quotations, see Trapped Driver "Knocked
Out" Dying Appeal to Rescuers, TIMES (London), Sept. 15, 1959, at 7.
252 For an elaboration of this basic conception, see FOOT, supra note 21, at 33-61.
253 See BLAcK's LAw DICnONARY 594 (8th ed. 2004) (describing "active euthanasia"

as "performed by a facilitator").
254

Hare, supra note 200, at 45.
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although embryos, if they are to become babies, need the help of the
women who carry them, to say that pregnant women are obliged to
provide this help is discriminatorily to deny those women their "personal self-government" 255 -to deny them a right, that is, to determine
if they are "capable of.. . nurturing a fetus and, ultimately, mothering
a child." 256 Placing on fertile women a duty of assistance by denying
them a right to an abortion creates, Emily Jackson elaborates, "an
extraordinary exception to the established principle that no individual can be compelled to use their body in order to save another's
life."25 7 Indeed, she adds, compelling a woman to save the life of

something that has not achieved legal personhood might be considered "especially bizarre" if the law does not force individuals to act
against their wishes to save those who have achieved legal personhood. 258 This last point seems especially important: if the fetus is
not legally recognized as a person, it is difficult to know how there
could be established a general legal duty-one not specific to any person, role, or institution-to provide it with assistance. It is important
also to bear in mind, nonetheless, that the character of the relationship between the pregnant woman and her fetus is unique; that "[h] er
fetus is not merely 'in her' . . . [but] 'of her and ...

hers more than

anyone's' because it is, more than anyone else's, her creation and her
responsibility." 259 If one accepts this proposition, and if one believes

that the fetus should be regarded as having legal personhood, it seems
to follow that the question of whether it should be assisted is answered
by reference to-the fact that the relationship between the fetus and
the woman who carries it is special rather than general. According to
this reasoning, in other words, the case for fetal protection ought to
be treated not as an exception to the rule that there is no general duty
to assist but as an instance raising a prima facie reason for imposing a
special duty to assist, given the nature of the relationship between the
pregnant woman and her fetus.
The claim that the fetus is, "more than anyone else's, [a
woman's] creation and her responsibility" speaks uneasily to the case
of the woman who is forced into sexual intercourse. Is the fetus that
she carries really best described as her creation? And does not holding her to be under a duty to assist her fetus essentially force her to
255
256
257
258
259
at 144

LINDA C. MCCLAJN, THE PLACE OF FILIS 228 (2006).

Id. at 230.
EMILYJACKSON, REGULATING REPRODUCTION 74

(2001).

Id.
RONALD DwoRKIN, LFE's DOMINION 55 (1993); see a/SOJACKSON, supra note 257,
unique biological relationship between a pregnant woman and

(discussing "the

her fetus").
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shoulder a burden which most people will never have to take on,
which she never wished to assume, and which might well terrify and
repulse her? 260 One Golden Rule-based answer to this last question

might be that allowing women to abort unwanted pregnancies, even
pregnancies attributable to rape, is to remedy one injustice with a different one: the asymmetric burden is dispensed with, but at the cost of
subjecting an "other"-the fetus-to treatment which we would not
have wanted to be subjected to ourselves. The answer is hardly the
most convincing. Even though I might be glad that my mother did
not have the pregnancy which led to my birth being terminated, I
might still-were she to reveal that the pregnancy was the result of
rape-take the view that she should not have been denied that option
had she sought it.
Later in this Article, 261 I shall consider the argument that the sec-

ond injustice to which I refer in the last paragraph is not merely different but is in fact greater than the first one-that neither the
burden borne by nor the right to self-government denied to women
faced with unwanted pregnancy can be considered a wrong equal to
that of deliberately killing the unborn. But first I want to examine
Hare's universal-prescriptivist approach to the problem. We head up
a blind alley, Hare begins, if we frame the abortion debate in terms of
whether the fetus is a person. Settling that debate one way or another
is impossible, for "person" can have several different meanings. But
what we do know is that, whether or not we consider the fetus a person, it has the potential to become a person. 262 Golden Rule reasoning shows us "why the potentiality of the fetus for becoming a person
raises a moral problem," 2 63 for if we modify the wording of the

Golden Rule and say that "we should do to others what we are glad was
done to us" then, "[i]f we are glad that nobody terminated the pregnancy that resulted in our birth, then we are enjoined not, ceteris
paribus, to terminate any pregnancy which will result in the birth of a
person having a life like ours." 2 64 Such reasoning "has a secure logical
foundation" 26 5-universal
prescriptivism-since it "requires us to
make the same moral judgment about . . .cases which are relevantly
260
(R.M.
261
262
Hare,
263
264
265

SeeJ.J. Thomson, A Defence of Abortion, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 112, 122-24
Dworkin ed., 1977).
See infra notes 343-52 and accompanying text.
See R.M. Hare, Abortion and the Golden Rule, 4 PHIL. & PUB. Air. 201, 207 (1975);
supra note 226, at 1.
Hare, supra note 262, at 207.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 211.
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similar."2 66 It is difficult, though perhaps not impossible, to imagine a
woman genuinely and consistently wishing that she herself had never
been born and citing this as a reason for being entitled to seek an
abortion.2 6 7 Even those who do feel this way do not have a reason
supporting abortion, Hare argues, because they will "wish that, if they
had been going to be glad that they were born"-if they would have
been glad to have been born but for the way life has worked out for
them-"nobody should have aborted them."2 68 Golden Rule reason269
ing, it seems, should "give cheer to the antiabortionists."
But such reasoning, Hare thinks, does not only support the position of the antiabortionist. A woman might make "a choice between
having this child now and having another child later."270 Her carrying
to term now means that there are other, possibly conceivable, chil266 Id. at 208-09. It is worth noting here the question of whether the Golden Rule
extends to animals. For a very well-formulated, prescriptivist-based argument that it
must do so, see TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 232-65 (1983). I am not
convinced. To say that we should treat animals as we would have them treat us is an
unintelligible moral requirement. But one has to be careful not to reduce this argument to the claim that animals cannot be entitled to treatment according to the
Golden Rule because they cannot themselves follow the Golden Rule. The reason, I
think, that the Golden Rule does not extend to animals is that we cannot say in the
case of animals in the same way as we can say of other human beings (including
nonsentient human beings) what it is that we would want were we in their position.
The problem is not that of lacking the capacity to imagine an experience or specific
animal desires-I agree with HARE, supra note 86, at 222-23, that we can imagine, in
particular, the pain that animals can suffer (so it is that we enact laws proscribing
animal cruelty)-but that we cannot understand animal selfhood as we understand
human selfhood.
267 The case of Nicolas Perruche, the French boy born with congenital rubella
who was in effect compensated for wrongful birth, is sometimes presented-probably
because the Cour de Cassation ruled that he had a right to sue his mother's physicians-as if he himself brought an action against the medical authorities for unhappiness at being born. But Perruche was neither able to sue because of, nor to express
happiness or unhappiness about, the fact that he was born. It was his parents who
sued (and who also were compensated), claiming both that their son had suffered
harm by the very fact of his birth and that they had suffered harm because, had the
laboratory not botched the test for rubella while Nicolas was still in the womb, his
mother would have sought-during her pregnancy, she had said that in the event of a
positive test she would seek-an abortion. See AXEL GOSSERIES, PENSER LA JUSTICE
ENTRE LES GENERATIONS: DE L'AFFAIRE PERRUCHE A LA RIFORME DES RETRAITES 43-80
(2004).
268 Hare, supra note 262, at 209 (emphasis added).
269 Id. at 206. For a similar argument, see also HarryJ. Gensler, A Kantian Argument Against Abortion, 49 PHIL. STUD. 83, 89-94 (1986) (arguing that since we would
not consent to injury or death to our persons while in the womb, logical consistency
requires that we do not injure or kill others while they are in the womb).
270 Hare, supra note 262, at 211.
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dren that she will not have, children who either cannot be conceived
because the woman is pregnant or who will not be conceived because
the parents may, after the birth of this child, decide to use contraception. Hare finds it strange that antiabortionists oppose stopping the
birth of the child conceived now "but say nothing" 27 1 about stopping
the birth of the child that might be conceived later. If a child has not
been conceived, it seems a mistake to talk of stopping its birth. Of
course, its conception might be stopped-but this cannot be what Hare
has in mind, for contraception is hardly a topic about which antiabortionists have "nothing" to say. However, let us work through his argument. S is glad that she was born, and if she is glad that she was born,
she must be glad that her parents procreated. This means, applying
Golden Rule reasoning, that S has a duty neither to abort nor to
abstain from procreation. But S cannot fulfill this duty both to the
unborn child currently in her womb and to any other children that
her current pregnancy stops her from conceiving: for S, "it is either
272
this child or the next one but not both."

Where this clash of duties arises and S knows that the present
fetus will be born "miserably handicapped" but has "every reason to
suppose that the next child will be completely normal and as happy as
most people," she will have a "reason to abort this fetus and proceed
to bring to birth the next child, in that the next child will be much
gladder to be alive than will this one." 2 73 In such a situation there will

still be a defeasible presumption against abortion, because with the
termination of the present fetus the probability of the woman conceiving another child reduces (because parents separate, die, become
sterile, and so on).274 But the argument shows us, Hare believes, that
the presumption against abortion is not as strong as antiabortionists
maintain.
If we are glad to be born, then "not to produce any single child
whom one might have produced lays one open to the charge that one
is not doing to that child as one is glad has been done to oneself (viz.
causing him to be born)."275 So does Hare's basic Golden Rule argument-leaving aside, that is, the predicament faced by S-establish a
case for unlimited procreation? Hare himself thinks not: genuinely
unlimited procreation would lead to an overpopulated world, and
there would come a point at which new births would impose "burdens
271
272
273
274
275

Id. at 212.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 214.
Id. at 218.
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on the other members [of society] great enough in sum to outweigh
the advantage gained by the additional member." 2 76 Even if the
others to whom we should do what we are glad was done to us include
potential as well as actual people, in other words, the good that they
might derive from our action (procreation) "may be outweighed by
harm done to other actual or potential people." 277 One of Hare's students has famously pointed out that, even for a utilitarian, the determination of what is an optimum population is far from
straightforward: we could mean the population size at which the average level of welfare will be as high as possible, or the population size at
which the total amount of welfare, that is, the average multiplied by
the number of people, is as great as possible. 278 Assuming, however,
that we do know how to determine when that optimum is reached,
there is, until we have reached it, no reason on Hare's analysis (again,
leaving aside the predicament faced by S) for limiting procreation.
By formulating Golden Rule reasoning as he does, Hare avoids
committing himself one way or the other on the question of whether
the fetus is a person. We will see soon that the more obvious way of
applying such reasoning to the abortion debate, what we might
broadly call a natural law perspective, must answer this question. Anyone who does adopt this perspective might wonder whether Hare is
engaging in Golden Rule reasoning at all: his emphasis on "gladness"
as a criterion requires us to ask, in the case of the severely impaired
fetus, not "how we would want to be treated were we in that position,"
but "how we should treat the fetus given that the child, if born, will
probably not be glad to be alive and given the chances of our having
another child who probably will be much gladder to be alive" Both
questions return us to the philosophical difficulty of imagining ourselves occupying a position radically different from our own. 279 The
second question, furthermore, raises at least two difficulties which do
not arise with the first question. From the fact that we are glad that
something was done (or not done) to us, first of all, it does not necessarily follow that we must consider it impermissible to have done (or
not to have done) that thing. To expand slightly on a point raised
earlier: a person who was conceived owing to rape, or whose mother
died giving birth having known that her pregnancy was life-threatening, may be glad not to have been aborted as a fetus yet might still
276
277
278
279

Id.
Id.
See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 381-90 (1984).
See Leslie A. Mulholland, Autonomy, Extended Sympathy and the Golden Rule, in
INQUIRIES INTO VALUES 89, 96 (Sander H. Lee ed., 1988); George Sher, Hare, Abortion
and the Golden Rule, 6 PHIL. & PUB. An'. 185, 188 (1977).
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maintain that his mother should have been allowed the option to seek
an abortion. 280 Secondly, the second question seems to demand less
28 1
an exercise in Golden Rule reasoning than in act-utilitarianism.
Ricoeur, it will be recalled, claimed that Golden Rule reasoning
demands that we reject the utilitarian's logic of the scapegoat. Yet
Hare's version of the Golden Rule makes no such demand: a current
pregnancy which will result in the birth of a severely handicapped
child might be terminated "if the termination... facilitates or renders
possible or probable the beginning of another more propitious
one." 282 Following this version of the Golden Rule would require a

woman to compare terminating what exists with allowing that existence to continue in the knowledge that doing so might prevent
another child coming into being, as if there is moral equivalence
between (1) a woman intentionally aborting and (2) a woman not
conceiving other children owing to the fact that she has decided to
take her current pregnancy to term. But the two instances are different, primarily because (1) refers to something actual (the fetus in the
woman's womb) and (2) does not (it refers to what might be the case
because of the woman not aborting the fetus in her womb).283 Hare
recognizes the distinction but attaches no significance to it. We
should "doubt... the assumption... that one cannot harm a person

by preventing him coming into existence" because, though we cannot
say that that person has his existence taken away from him, "he is
denied' existence and therefore the enjoyments that come with being
alive. 28 4 The person to whom Hare is referring is denied, however,
not existence but rather the chance to exist; it is not that "[w] e do not
know who he will be," 28 5 but that we do not know whether he will be.

280

See David Boonin-Vail, Against the Golden Rule Argument Against Abortion, 14 J.
187, 190 (1997).

APPLIED PHIL.

281

See Antonella Corradini, Goldene Regel, Abtreibung und Pflichten gegeniiber mog-

lichen Individuen, 48 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG 21 (1994).
282 Hare, supra note 262, at 221.
283 For Hare's own attempt to play down the distinction between actual and logically possible instances, see HARE, supra note 187, at 113-16.
284 Hare, supra note 262, at 221; see also R.M. Hare, Abortion: Reply to Brandt, 15
Soc. THEORY & PRAc. 25, 30 (1989) (defending primarily the proposition that nonidentifiable people can be harmed rather than the proposition that terminating an
actual pregnancy might be justified on the basis that not to do so denies possible
future ones).
285 Hare, supra note 262, at 220.
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NATURAL LAW REASONING

Hare, we saw earlier, is not the only philosopher to have tried to
salvage the Golden Rule both from the type of criticism that was
directed at it by Kant and from the counterproductive utilitarian
defense that we examined. I have criticized Hare's philosophy, particularly his attempts to apply the Golden Rule to assistance and abortion problems; I hope, nevertheless, that these criticisms do not
detract from the fact that universal prescriptivism is a powerful philosophical argument, not only because it makes us question why, as a
matter of moral principle, we should ever tolerate double standards
where cases are relevantly similar, but also because it shows that
Golden Rule reasoning need not be connected to particular tastes and
preferences. Before concluding I want to consider, if only sketchily,
the treatment of this type of reasoning within another philosophical
tradition, the natural law tradition. I have intimated already that this
tradition defends the Golden Rule. But I also indicated that I want to
consider natural law reasoning not alongside other defenses of the
Golden Rule but as a discrete topic. There are various reasons for
considering it thus. Whereas the philosophers we have considered so
far who defend the Golden Rule as a principle of moral action are
essentially responding to criticisms that came to the fore during the
Enlightenment, natural law arguments in favor of the Golden Rule are
longstanding and tend to be not merely defenses of the principle but
also efforts to provide practical guidance concerning how we can live
according to it. Natural lawyers, furthermore, sometimes develop
arguments in defense of the Golden Rule that other defenders of the
Rule would reject.
Natural lawyers do not always defend the Golden Rule in the
same way. Indeed, sometimes their positions differ radically. Consider, for example, the argument that the Golden Rule is itself proof
that there are universally valid natural laws because it is by following
the Rule that we grasp that justice requires: (1) respect for fellow citizens and their property; (2) "treatment of equals equally and unequals unequally; ' 28 6 and (3) "[a] shared language" which, "combined
with the gift of imagination [ Vorstellungsgabe] ," enables us "to put ourselves in another's place." 28 7 The problem with this argument is that,
286 Reiner, Die Goldene Regel und das Naturrecht, supra note 88, at 242. For the same
general argument, see Werner Maihofer, Die Natur der Sache, 44 ARCHly FOR RECHTSUND SOZ1ALPHILOSOPHIE 145, 167-68 (1948).

287 Reiner, Die Goldene Regel und das Naturrecht, supra note 88, at 246. Whatever
putting ourselves in the place of another requires, it does not require that we share a

language.
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as we know from the ground covered already in this Article, "treat
others as you would have them treat you" does not-certainly absent
serious philosophical elaboration-serve as a principle for distinguishing between morally right and wrong action.
Augustine showed himself to be wise to this problem in his interpretation of Matthew 7:12 ("Always treat others as you would like them
to treat you: that is the Law and the prophets."). 288 The train of
thought behind this passage would seem (particularly in light of what
Matthew has to say in the immediately preceding verse) 289 to be that,
as God gives good gifts to those who ask Him, so Christians ought to
render to others the service, the good things, that they would want
others to render to them. It seems reasonable to infer that early translators of the Bible may have detected this train of thought in Matthew
7:12, for most of the early Latin versions (although not the Vulgate
itself) render the passage: "All good things therefore whatsoever you
would that men should do unto you ... "290 Augustine believed that
Latin translators added "good" to Matthew 7:12 because it was necessary "to clarify the meaning." 291 For, without such clarification, "the
thought suggested itself that if someone wished something wicked
done to him . . . and first practiced this [wicked action] upon the
person by whom he wished it to be performed upon himself," there
could arise a "ridiculous" situation in which an agent would "allege
this text"-whatever things you would have others do to you, so you
should do unto them-as justification for wicked action, as if his
action "lived up to this prescription" (that is, as if the prescription
condoned his behaving in the same wicked way toward others as he
would have them behave toward him) 292 The possibility of a person
oppressing others in the name of the Golden Rule was certainly not
lost on Augustine in the late fourth century.
Note that the addition of "good" clarifies the meaning of Matthew
7:12. It does not change it. "[T]he statement is complete and quite
perfect even without the addition of this word," Augustine continues,
288 Matthew 7:12 (New English Bible).
289 See Matthew 7:11 (New English Bible) ("If you then, bad as you are, know how to
give your children what is good for them, how much more will your heavenly Father
give good things to those who ask him!").
290 See ST. AUGUSTINE, THE LORD'S SERMON ON THE Mourr 161 (John J. Jepson
trans., 1948) (c. 393).

291

Id.

292 Id. For an interpretation of Matthew 7:12 (and of Luke 6:31) which does not
invoke Augustine but which reaches the same conclusion-that the New Testament
Golden Rule cannot be read as an endorsement of oppressive behavior towards
others-see Martin Behnisch, The Golden Rule as an Expression of Jesus' Preaching,17
BANGALORE THEOLOGICAL

F. 83, 83-84 (1985).
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"[f]or the expression used, 'whatsoever you would,' should not be
taken as spoken in a broad, general sense, but with a restricted application: that is to say, the will is present only in the good; in evil and
wicked actions cupidity is the word, not will."293 Whereas post-Kantian

defenders of the Golden Rule have generally tried to show that there
is no necessary connection between our following the Rule and our
particular tastes and preferences, Augustine was of the view that there
is a connection, but that we must distinguish the will, that is, the openended (never fully realized) pursuit of the good, 294 from cupidity, that
is, inordinate and unreasonable desire. Following this distinction we
might say that the appellants in R v. Brown acted on their desiresthey had the desire to participate in harmful and degrading acts-but
not according to will: their actions could not be described, even the
appellants (to echo a point made earlier) could not intelligibly have
295
described those actions, as good.

In the thirteenth century, Aquinas interpreted the Golden Rule
using Augustine's distinction. 2 96 But Aquinas also elaborated the
notion of human willing. Emphasizing the relationship between treating others as you wish them to treat you and the neighbor principle,
he recalls Aristotle's observation that "[o]ur [dispositions, feelings,
and actions] which are directed towards our friends and by which
friendships are defined seem to have originated from those of a man
in relation to himself."29 7 We have encountered already Ricoeur's version of this claim: esteem for others, for Ricoeur, is necessary to genuine self-esteem. 29 8 For Aquinas, similarly, to love one's neighbor-to
direct our will to the good of others-is to act consistently with one's
293 AUGUSTINE, supra note 290, at 162. Compare with, for a modern variant on the
argument, SIEGFRIED ALFONS LESNIK, DIE GOLDENE REGEL: PRINZIP DER NEUEN
MENSCHLICHKEIT IN NATURRECHTLICHER UND BIBLISCHER AUFFASSUNG 55 (1975) (arguing that within the natural law tradition the Golden Rule is connected with the principle, "do good and avoid evil" ["Tue das Gute und meide das B6se"]).

294

See AUGUSTINE, supra note 290, at 163-64. The follower of the Golden Rule,
in order that his works may be truly good, does not seek the pleasure of his
fellow men as the purpose of his good works ....
[W]hatever service he
renders to another he renders it with the intention he would like manifested
towards himself, that is, of not expecting any temporal favor from him.

Id.
295
296

See supra notes 118-29 and accompanying text.
See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUPER EVANGELIUM S.

MATTHAEI LECTURA

648, at

102 (P. Raphaelis Cai, Marietti, 5th ed. 1951) (remarking on Matthew 7:12 and Matthew 6:12).
297

ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 166-67 (Hippocrates G. Apostle trans.,

D. Reidel Publ'g 1975) (c. 350 BC) (second alteration in original).
298 See supra notes 38-51 and accompanying text.
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own good. 299 The Golden Rule as found in Matthew 7:12 (even shorn
of the word "good") "represents a certain rule for loving one's neighbour" and so "[i]t is, in a certain sense, an explanation of th [e] commandment" to love one's neighbor as oneself.30 0 So it is-to recall
our critique of Gewirth on this point-that the Golden Rule is not
itself what Aquinas understands to be the master principle of morality
(love of neighbor as oneself) but rather a means by which we can
bring specificity to that principle.30 1
On this interpretation of the Golden Rule, then, to do (good) to
others is to do (good) to oneself. The general point is one of the
most important to be drawn from the natural law tradition: that our
30 2
choices are constitutive of ourselves, they pertain to our reason.
The reason the bystander cannot reasonably be asked to end the life
of the lorry driver-to recall Hare's striking euthanasia dilemma 3 03is that to do so would be to ask him to make a choice which would
radically alter, almost certainly for the worse, his understanding of his
self. The choices we freely make have an impact on and (unless or
until we make an incompatible choice) persist in our character. The
choice to harm others-this must be one of the most enduring
themes of literature and art-is, even when made with good intentions, a self-disintegrative choice, a choice that tends to eat at us, to
lessen us in our own eyes (let alone the eyes of others), to make us, as
Socrates put it, miserable as well as pitiable.3 0 4 Aquinas fully understood that this argument raises the problem of indiscriminate regard:
if the Golden Rule is a standard which enables us to instantiate the
general notion of loving our neighbors as ourselves, what room is
299 See FINNIS, supra note 176, 127-28.
300 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, 29 SUMMA THEOLOGIae: THE OLD LAW, at q. 9 9 , art. I, at
33 (R.J. Batten trans., McGraw Hill 1969) (1271).
301 See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
302 Here is not the place to differentiate choice from preference and to explain
how both choices and preferences can be decisions. Crudely speaking, the point is
that whereas to prefer is to opt for that which has the greatest utilitarian appeal, to
choose is to opt for that which is consistent with one's will but not necessarily or convincingly supported by utilitarian reasoning. A fundamental fault with, say, neoclassical economics as applied to law is that it makes no distinction between those instances
in which we can identify one option as the correct option and more open-ended
instances-whether or not to marry or have children are obvious examples-where
we know that the choice that we make could bring heartbreak as well as happiness but
is nonetheless not meaningfully reducible to any sort of cost-benefit calculation simply because the choice we make seems, at the time that we make it, to be the right
choice for us.
303 See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
304 See PLATO, GORGiAS 53 (Walter Hamilton trans., Penguin Books 1960) (c. 405

BC).
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there, if indeed there is any room, for preferring to do good for some
and not for others? The physical remoteness of some "neighbors"obviously more of a problem in the thirteenth century than it is
today-means that there is nothing one can do (beyond prayer) to
seek to benefit them. 30 5 And so while every human being, for Aquinas, is our neighbor, we have to be realistic about the limits of our
capacity to make an impact on the lives of others.
Of course we should also be realistic-leaving aside the issue of
physical remoteness-about our general willingness to prefer to
attend to the welfare of ourselves, our families, and our friends over
and above others. Does it make sense to speak of Golden Rule reasoning as impartialif treating others as we would have them treat us-that
is, bringing specificity to the neighbor principle-can involve preferring to treat some but not others as we would be treated? Modern
natural lawyers building on Aquinas' philosophy have not shied away
from this problem, although it is impossible here to do anything more
0
than sketch what I think is the most convincing treatment of it.3 6
The beginning of the sketch will be recognizable to almost anyone
who has studied legal philosophy. Moral norms-prohibitions on killing, theft, acts of dishonesty and deception, requirements that
promises be kept, and other similar negative and positive precepts the
capricious contravention of which anyone would consider immoralidentify and render intelligible certain basic (self-evident, irreducible)
goods which we instantiate (make actual), through intelligent choice
and action. 30 7 These goods-the goods of human life itself, truth, aes305 See FINNIS, supra note 176, at 126 n.112; Finnis, supra note 17, at 174, 177 n.4.
306 For an account of the modern history and development of the natural law with
which I am concerned here, see NICHOLAS C. BAMFORTH & DAVID A.J. RICHARDS,
PATRIARCHAL RELIGION, SEXUALITY, AND GENDER 56-92 (2008). Bamforth and Richards offer this account by way of prelude to a detailed critique of modem natural law,
their principal complaint being that modern natural lawyers, contrary to their own
claims, advance arguments which are essentially religious in character and which presuppose a commitment to particular religious beliefs and teachings. An assessment of
this critique is beyond the scope of this Article, though I would say at the very least
that the authors might have done more justice to the ways in which modern natural
lawyers have sought to uncover, revise, and replace indefensible natural law and religious claims. See, e.g.,
FINNIS, supra note 103, at 48 ("[T]he argument ... that human
faculties are never to be diverted ('perverted') from their natural ends . . . is
ridiculous.").
307 SeeJOHN FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES 41-42 (1991); see alsoJohn M. Finnis, Law,
Morality, and "Sexual Orientation,"69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049, 1065 (1994) (describing "judgments . .. by decent people who cannot articulate explanatory premises for
those judgments, which they reach rather by an insight into what is and is not consistent with realities whose goodness they experience and understand at least sufficiently
to will and choose");John Finnis, Natural Law and UnnaturalActs, 11 HEYrHROPJ. 365,
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thetic experience, friendship, skillful work and play, religion (agnostically defined), and practical reasonableness 3 08 -are basic in the sense
that, unlike many goods, they are reasons for acting which require no
further reason.30 9 They need no demonstration, are desirable for
their own sake-are intrinsically rather than instrumentally good-

366 (1970) ("Natural law ... is one's permanent dynamic orientation towards an
understanding grasp of the goods that can be realized by free choice, together with a
bias . . . towards actually making choices that are intelligibly (because intelligently)
related to the goods which are understood to be attainable, or at stake, in one's situation. Now the jargon-laden sentence just uttered is a piece of speculation, theorizing,
doctrine about natural law. But the point of all such theorizing can be little more
than to uncover what is already available to everyone, submerged and confused, perhaps, but shaping everyone's practical attitudes and choices of what to do, what to
love and what to respect.").
308 Being practically reasonable means adopting a coherent plan of life, having no
arbitrary preferences among values and persons, maintaining detachment from
projects, not abandoning commitments lightly, eschewing inefficient methods, not
making choices which serve only to damage the realization of other basic goods, fostering "the common good" of one's community, and acting according to one's conscience. See FINNIS, supra note 103, at 100-26. There is no exhaustive list of, or
definitive terminology for, the basic goods. The best-known modem effort at articulation-certainly the one best known to lawyers-is Finnis. See id. at 85-90. The list
omits (though hints at the possibility of) marriage as a basic good. See id. at 86-87. In
later works, Finnis has added it. See, e.g.,John Finnis, Is NaturalLaw Theory Compatible
with Limited Government?, in NATURAL LAW, LiBERALISM AND MoRALiTY 1, 4 (R. P.
George ed., 1996) [hereinafter Finnis, Limited Government]; John Finnis, Observations
for the Austral Conference to Mark the 25th Anniversary of Natural Law and Natural Rights,
13 CUADERNOS DE EXTENSI6N JURDiCA 27, 28 (2006). Although, as will become clear
in due course, I am largely sympathetic towards Finnis' argument concerning basic
human goods, I am not convinced that marriage belongs on the list. While basic

goods are in principle open to pursuit by all, marriage, for Finnis, is by definition
heterosexual: a same-sex partnership "may, in some circumstances, be a praiseworthy
commitment," but it "has nothing to do with marriage." John Finnis, The Good of
Marriage and the Morality of Sexual Relations: Some Philosophical and Historical Observations, 42 AM. J. JuRis. 97, 132 (1997). Finnis acknowledges that some people are
"exclusively and irreversibly homosexual," id. at 123, and argues it is not the natural
inclinations of these people that is contrary to the good of marriage, but their choice
to act on these inclinations. See, e.g.,John Finnis, An IntrinsicallyDisordered Inclination,
in SAME-SEx ATrRAcrION: A PARENTS' GUIDE 89, 90-91 (John F. Harvey & Gerald V.
Bradley eds., 2003). These inclinations, however, deny them both the faculty and the
competence (in contrast to those, such as children, who have the faculty but lack the
competence) to be committed to marriage as a basic good. In short, I cannot see how
marriage can be a basic good meant for everyone.
309 For example: a hungry person eats to avoid starvation. The good here (not
starving) is the reason for the action (eating). But there is a reason that explains our
interest in that good: that is, we want to avoid starving because we want to live-we
value life (self-preservation) as a basic good.
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and presuppose no moral judgments. 3 10 But they "are not mere
abstractions"; rather, "they are aspects of the real well-being of fleshand-blood individuals."' 3 1 1 By examining human volition-our
choices to act, or not to act, according to moral norms-we come to
understand these basic goods as integral to human fulfillment.
Indeed, it is by making choices compatible with these basic goods, by
being practically reasonable, that we contribute to "[t] he ideal of integral human fulfillment"-that is, to "the realization, so far as possible,
of all the basic goods in all persons, living together in complete harmony. ' 31

2

And it is by making choices incompatible with these

goods-by failing to use reason to fetter our urges and impulses-that
313
we do the opposite.
Although it is in the character of basic goods that they are integral to human fulfillment, they are not integral to the fulfillment of
the needs and interests of particularpersons. "[T] he basic goods are
human goods, and can in principle be pursued, realized, and participated in by any human being."3 14 The Golden Rule can therefore be
understood to be impartial in the sense that the basic human goods
which provide reasons for action,- including following the Golden
Rule, are agent-neutral: there is "fundamental impartiality among the
3 15
human subjects who are or may be partakers of those goods."
There is no incompatibility between speaking of the Golden Rule as
impartial in this sense, modern natural lawyers argue, and treating
different people differently. All that the Golden Rule requires is that
"differential treatment be justified [because of] inevitable limits on
one's action" 3 6-that my failure to treat another as I would have him
treat me is explicable by the fact that circumstances make it impossible for me to treat him thus-or because failing to treat different people differently would mean acting contrary to the requirements of the
basic goods themselves: because it would mean acting dishonestly, for
310 See, e.g., FINNIS, supra note 103, at 59, 73.
311 Id. at 225.
312 Germain Grisez et al., PracticalPrinciples, Moral Truth, and UltimateEnds, 32 AM.
J. Juis. 99, 131 (1987).
313 See FINNIS, supra note 307, at 41-44.
314 Id. at 106.
315 Id. at 107; see also MARX C. MuRPHY, NATURAL LAW AND PRACTICAL RATIONALITY
201-04 (2001) ("On Finnis's view, all of the fundamental reasons for action are agentneutral .... ."); Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law, Impartialism, and Others' Good, 60 THOMIST 53, 56 (1996) (stating that the Grisez, Boyle, and Finnis view "embraces impartialism by holding that while the character of something as a good does depend on its
being fulfilling of human interests, its character as a good does not depend on the
identity of the person whose interests that good fulfills").
316 Finnis, supra note 57, at 137.
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example, or neglecting the needs of one's dependents. 3 17 Since the
basic goods are agent-neutral, since my good is no better or worse
than yours, such differentiation by reference to basic human goods is
not the same as applying the Golden Rule by reference to one's tastes
or preferences: "we are showing no improper favour to individuals as
such . .. no egoistic or group bias, no partiality." 3 18 Applying the
Golden Rule does not mean ignoring one's feelings. Quite the opposite: it requires the discernment of one's feelings-in determining
whether to act in any particular instance, one relies on intuitions
regarding how great a burden one can accept and what benefits one
thinks one's actions will bring (what modern natural lawyers sometimes refer to as "pre-moral commensuration" 3 19 ). These intuitive
feelings are the feelings of "the mature person of fully reasonable
character" 320 whose "deliberation and action is open to and in line
with integral human fulfillment,"32 1 and so genuinely to apply the
Golden Rule must also mean assessing, sometimes instantaneously,
our feelings about our options-about what we can do-in accordance with "a rational and objective standard of inter-personal impartiality," 322 that is, in accordance with the requirements of the basic

goods which provide reasons for action. The standards of fully reasonable conduct, we might say, are to be measured by "[t]he ideal of
'3
integral human fulfillment."

23

This natural law defense of the Golden Rule differs radically from
the other defenses that we have encountered. It candidly acknowledges that when we follow the Golden Rule, what we feel cannot be
317 See, e.g.,
1 GRiSEZ, supranote 56, at 211-12; Finnis, supra note 57, at 137-38; see
also Finnis, supra note 6, at 227 (explaining that the Golden Rule only excludes preferences "that do not correspond to intelligible aspects of the real reasons for action");
Finnis, supra note 62, at 29-30 (same).
318 FINNIS, supra note 103, at 109.
One has no general responsibility to give the well-being of other people as
much care and concern as one gives one's own; the good of others is as
really good as one's own good, but is not one's primary responsibility, and to
give one's own good priority is not, as such, to violate the requirement of
impartiality.
Id. at 304.

319 See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS ET AL., NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, MORALrrY AND REALISM
265-66 (1987); Finnis, supra note 57, at 149; see asoJohn Finnis, Allocating Risks and
Suffering: Some Hidden Traps, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 193, 206 (1990) ("The Golden Rule
in its application involves a discernment of feelings and then a dispassionate rational
adherence to the standard of care established by one's feelings.").
320 Finnis, supra note 6, at 228.
321 Id. at 227.
322 Finnis, supra note 57, at 149.
323 Finnis, supra note 6, at 233.
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insignificant. The natural law account shows that feelings have a legitimate part to play in our efforts to accord fair treatment, that our
preliminary intuitions concerning how to treat others must-since we
are trying to be fair-be measured by the requirements of the basic
goods which delimit the range of reasonable action. I have-and I
expect this will confirm most readers' suspicions-presented various
accounts of Golden Rule reasoning in what I consider to be an ascending order of credibility. This particular natural law defense of the
Golden Rule is the most cogent of the various defenses considered
here, I think, not only because of the intelligibility of the premise (the
self-evidence of basic goods) and the reasoning, but also because it
eschews the artificial assumption either that the Golden Rule can
somehow be divorced from the feelings of agents and recipients or
that any such feeling, if it must be taken into account (recall Hare's
formulation of the Golden Rule as "we should do to others what we
are glad was done

to

US"),324 can be satisfactorily subjected to some

sort of proportionalist-typically, utilitarian-rationalization.
CONCLUSION

There is something to be said for ending this essay here-on a
somewhat bullish note. But to do so would, I think, be to sidestep
some difficult questions. I want to conclude by considering perhaps
the most obvious of them. Midway through this Article I briefly entertained the notion of the Golden Rule as a "neutral principle, 3 2 5 a
notion which some lawyers might argue I should have dwelt on for
longer, not only because it might have put this entire inquiry on
firmer ground but also because it would most likely lead to an examination of what it could ever mean to speak of the Golden Rule as a
legal standard. To put the question in a leading way: if Golden Rule
reasoning-informed by goods which are essential to human fulfillment and flourishing-essentially requires that we do good to, and
avoid actions which offend against the good of, others, how can it
make for anything other than legal norms which are morally uncontroversial but wholly vacuous?
The first, minor, point to make in response to such a question is
that law often facilitates Golden Rule reasoning. Determining the relevantly similar instances in which I would want others to treat me as I
propose to treat them may require that I consider current legal rules
and precedents. Law understood thus is essentially an exercise in purposive or technical rather than moral reasoning, a means for agreeing
324
325

See supra text accompanying note 264.
See supra notes 133-46 and accompanying text.
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or resolving our disputes over what we can do in our interactions with
others. 326 The second, far more important, point to make stems from
Michael Sandel's observation (Sandel himself is following Aquinas)
that liberal justice does not demand neutrality as between conceptions
of what makes for a good life or a refusal to pass judgment on the
moral worth of particular human activities.3 27 None of us can completely separate our deliberations about political morality from our
personal convictions, and so when we support particular public decisions and policies we are (unless we are being hypocritical) supporting decisions and policies that are consistent with our private values
and ideals. 328 Certainly liberalism entails public justification-constructive negotiation among people who share a basic commitment to
particular values and ideals, and the filtering out or domestication of
values and ideals which are not shared-but public justification does
not require that equal moral weight be accorded to everybody's values
and ideals. 329 Likewise, following the Golden Rule, understood as a
choice based on reasons for action which ought to be accepted
because of their intrinsic goodness-because their soundness or validity as reasons for action cannot be explained by appealing to other
reasons-requires that we judge some actions and ways of life, though
not people, 3 30 to be morally preferable to others. And so when natural lawyers refer to the Golden Rule, their point usually 331 is that to
follow the Rule is to choose-or that to violate the Rule is to
impede-a course of action compatible with the realization of basic
human good(s). Examples would be arguments to the effect that
treating others as we would have them treat us requires us to be truthful to others (though not necessarily that we divulge secrets) ,332 to be
326

327

See Finnis, supra note 62, at 10; Finnis, supra note 57, at 142.
See Michael J. Sandel, Judgemental Toleration, in NATURAL LAw, LIBERALISM AND

MORALITY,

328

See

supra note 308, at 107-12.
STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY

IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALSM

329

59-64 (1991).

See id. at 261-62.

330 See supra note 198.
331 Though not always: a moral right derived from Golden Rule reasoning might
sometimes be matched or eclipsed by some other moral consideration. So, for example, following the Golden Rule requires us not to exchange money for friendship (by
stealing, say, or borrowing without repaying)-we wouldn't want our friends to do
this to us-yet there might be a countervailing moral responsibility to take and use

our friends' money for good purposes (for example, the student who takes money out
of a collective housefund to pay an engineer to repair the central heating, even
though the rest of his flatmates had wanted to spend the money on nights out). See
Finnis, supra note 6, at 232.
332 See 2 GRISEZ, supra note 17, at 410-11, 417.
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mindful of the needs of others when we use resources, 333 and to be
willing, having benefited from our predecessors' shouldering of burdens, to shoulder those burdens for the benefit of those who will succeed us when the time comes for us to do so;33 4 the same can be said
of arguments to the effect that the Golden Rule can justify conscientious objection, whistleblowing, breaking from a prior undertaking,
and refusing to locate one's business (even though it may be legally
permissible to locate one's business) in a country where, say, employees are paid below the minimum wage guaranteed in one's own country. 335 Many legal norms will be supported by the natural law version
of the Golden Rule, but many will not be; indeed, to reiterate the
more general point made in the introduction to this essay, many
accepted legal positions will not be supported by Golden Rule
reasoning.
There is, of course, no reason to think that all legal norms supported by the Golden Rule-certainly the natural law version of the
Golden Rule as outlined here-will be uncontroversial. As an illustration of the point, and by way of conclusion, consider again the subject
of abortion. The natural law application of the Golden Rule to the
abortion problem is much more straightforward than the argument
advanced by Hare. But because the natural law version of the Rule is
more straightforward-the conventional "do to others as we would
have them do to us" rather than Hare's unconventional "do to others
what we are glad was done to us"-the resulting argument cannot be
framed, as Hare's is framed, as if it were essentially about what we are
glad we became. The argument has to address what Hare was at pains
to sidestep: the status of the fetus. If we apply the Golden Rule to this
problem, the answer it yields is obvious enough: we should treat
others as we would have others treat us, and so if we would have others
abstain from actions intended to end our lives (as distinct from
instances of double effect where death is a foreseen side-effect of an
action intended to serve human good), we should not perform such
actions on others. But how are we to interpret "others"? The answer
is obviously crucial, because as soon as we are dealing with "others" we
are, according to the Golden Rule, dealing with entities to be subjected to the same standards and principles of treatment as we would
have applied to us. John Rawls, in his last works on public reason,
333

See 3 GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUs: DIFFICULT MORAL QuES438 (1997).
334 See Finnis, supranote 6, at 228; see also Finnis, supra note 62, at 51-52 (explaining that natural law property theory seeks to encourage the "dynamic and forwardlooking" use of resources).
335 See 2 GRJSEZ, supra note 17, at 760-61; 3 GRISEZ, supra note 333, at 559.
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argues that justifying political decisions in a way that is reasonably
acceptable to everyone essentially means demonstrating ourselves to
be sincere practitioners of the Golden Rule: being prepared, that is,
not only to offer fair standards of treatment to others but also agreeing to act according to those standards even when doing so would be
contrary to our own interests. 3 36 This system of citizenship, he continues, is one "we enter only by birth and exit only by death."3 37 It would
be easier to dismiss this last remark as casual were Rawls not reiterating it. 338 Committed will theorists argue that claims must be enforceable (or waivable) by claimholders themselves if the claims are to count
as rights. But Rawls' remark provides a vivid illustration of why we do
better to speak of rights protecting interests, including interests
ascribed to those who, for whatever reason, cannot make a case for
themselves. If there could be no right to be treated according to the
Golden Rule until birth, no reasonably minded supporter, let alone
opponents, of a right to abortion would consider the range of protec3 39
tions guaranteed to the unborn to be sufficient.
Of course, accepting that it is not the fact of birth that makes us
persons does not answer but simply returns us to the question of what
it means to refer to "others" in this context. The argument I want to
consider proceeds from the premise that life begins at conception
because the conceptus (the fertilized human egg) marks the beginning of our selves-because my personal genetic constitution, the
integral organism that I am (and will be until I die), can be traced to
that point 34 0-and so we are all "others," entitled to the same moral
consideration, from that point onward. Ronald Dworkin is dismissive
of the premise; it appears to inform "the scalding rhetoric of the pro336 SeeJoHN RAw.S, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, at xlii, xliv (1996);John Rawls, The Idea
of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 765, 770 (1997).
337 RAwLs, supra note 336, at xliii.
338 See id. at 12 (" [T] he basic structure is that of a closed society .... Its members
enter it only by birth and leave it only by death.").
339 SeeJohn Finnis, Public Reason, Abortion, and Cloning, 32 VAL. U. L. REv. 361,
372-73 (1998).
[T]he question arises why Rawls draws the boundary of justice, fairness and
reciprocity at birth. This question does not seek to settle the rights of the
mother over and against the unborn child. It is just the question of how it
could be rational to think that the child just before birth has no rights (no
status in justice, fairness, reciprocity) while the child just after birth has the
rights of a citizen free and equal to other citizens.
Id.
340 SeeJ. Finnis, The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: A Reply toJudith Thompson, in THE
PHILOSOPHY oF LAw, supra note 260, at 129, 151-52; John Finnis, "The Thing I Am".
PersonalIdentity in Aquinas and Shakespeare, 22 Soc. PHIL. & POL. 250, 253 (2005).
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life movement," he observes, "[b]ut very few people-even those who
belong to the most vehemently anti-abortion groups-actually believe
[in it], whatever they say. '3

41

I suspect the primary reason many peo-

ple balk at the premise is that accepting it would commit them to
treating as murder certain actions which they do not regard as murder, and which they think only the most callous legal system could
classify as murder. We might reasonably ask, nevertheless, if the premise is as little supported as Dworkin thinks: in some conservative
states in the United States, for example, political mileage has occa3 42
sionally been gained from supporting a complete ban on abortion.
A former colleague of Dworkin's is very clearly committed to the
premise. If one accepts that abortion is deliberately killing the
unborn, John Finnis argues, and that deliberate killing is wrong, then
abortion is a denial of the unborn's right to the equal protection of
the laws against homicide. 343 The unborn are others, and since the
Golden Rule requires that we treat others as we would have them treat
us, the unborn should have the same right not to be intentionally and
unjustly killed as the rest of us. Just how far the unborn is from birth
is irrelevant: we might deny that the early human embryo has the status of an other, a person,
[b]ut the denial is quite vain. You only have to scrutinise the language, the thoughts, the awareness and the decisions of those who
want their baby to survive and flourish, and of those who use their
skills for that objective, to see that when people's interests do not
conflict with the interests of the embryo, they are perfectly well
aware that they are dealing with an individual human being, a him
or a her, a subject, a who not a what, as irreplaceable as a baby
34 4
immediately before or after birth.
Even if we acknowledge the legitimacy of this argument, Judith
Jarvis Thomson argues-even if, that is, we concede that there is no
way of refuting once and for all the claim that fertilized eggs have a
right to life-this does not mean we must accept the argument that
there is a "conclusive reason for asserting that they do have a right to
341 DWORKIN, supra note 259, at 13.
342 SeeJAcKsON, supra note 257, at 73 (noting that George W. Bush made support
for a complete ban on abortion part of his successful campaign for the Republican
nomination in 2000 (though it ought to be pointed out thatJackson's position is, on
this issue, much the same as Dworkin's: that "very few people" believe that a fetus is a
life from the moment of conception)).
343 See Finnis, Limited Government, supra note 308, at 17-18.
344 John Finnis, Some Fundamental Evils in GeneratingHuman Embyos by Cloning, in
ETHICS AND LAW IN BIOLOGICAL REsFARCH 99, 102 (Cosimo Marco Mazzoni ed., 2002).
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life."13 45 If we are open-minded and accept that it is reasonable to
argue either that the fetus does or that it does not have a right to life
from the moment of conception, we ought to concede the permissibility of abortion, because "if abortion rights are denied," then this constraint is imposed on a ground that those who favor abortion rightsthe constrained, as it were-"are not in the least unreasonable in
rejecting outright. ' 3 4 6 If the reasons for the constraint against abortion are no more compelling than the reasons against such constraint,
so that the case against abortion is not one that the constrained are
unreasonable in rejecting, constraining abortion would be wrong
since it would mean that anti-abortionists had got their way for no
34 7
other reason than that they had asserted that they are right.
But why, if this argument reaches stalemate, should the law take
the side of those who deny that the fetus has a right to life from the
moment of conception: "why should the deniers win?" 48 Because,
Thomson responds, "the situation is not symmetrical. '34 9 The justificatory burden should always fall on those who wish to see the law
changed so that it interferes with personal choice. There is no reason
to think this justificatory burden will never be met: there was a time
when a primary reason for outlawing abortions was that the procedure
could not be performed without serious risk to a woman's health.
There is also no reason to think that those who seek legal change will
always be those who oppose a right to abortion. Within a jurisdiction
the established position in law might be that abortion is not permitted: this was essentially the case in the United States until the
Supreme Court overturned prior state and federal laws barring abortion by deciding that a woman's choice to seek a termination is (until
the point of viability) constitutionally protected.3 50 And it is difficult
to imagine any opponent of abortion not pointing out that the freedom they wish to see curtailed is the freedom to commit a grave harm,
to kill the unborn. Thomson herself seems to concede the point
when she observes that there is no conclusive reason for denying that
fertilized eggs have a right to life-that it makes "perfectly good
sense," to use her phrase, to speak of the unborn having a right, in the
same way that we all have a right, not to be intentionally and unjustly
killed.35 1 Since it cannot be demonstrated that the unborn have a
345 Judith Jarvis Thomson, Abortion, BOSTON REV., Summer 1995, at 11, 13.
346 Id. at 14.
347 See id.
348 Id.
349 Id. at 15.
350 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973).
351 Thomson, supra note 345, at 13.
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right to life, Thomson argues, those who object to abortion must meet
the burden of showing why outlawing abortion is not objectionable.
But those who consider abortion objectionable will in all likelihood
claim that the burden is dispensed with by virtue of the fact that
Thomson leaves their central claim-that abortion is murderuncontested.
"On many topics the views of reasonable men are poles apart,"
Lord Reid once observed, yet "[w] hen we come to how a man should
behave towards his neighbour there are no such deep cleavages," even
if "there is room for some difference of opinion." 3 52 With the topic of
abortion, the possibility of deep cleavages, of finding one another
poles apart, is obvious and real. Golden Rule reasoning, as I have
explained it in this essay, is exemplified neither by arguments which
treat the Rule as connected to the desires of specific agents and recipients nor by arguments which fail to disprove this connection, but
rather by universal prescriptivism and, especially, by natural law philosophy. There is certainly no reason to think that the perspective on
Golden Rule reasoning advanced here will bring opponents over
abortion closer together. The simple fact is that on the topic of abortion, as we have seen, such reasoning draws us to some stark, some
might say unpalatable, conclusions.
But Golden Rule reasoning, as I explain it, does require that we
decide who our neighbors are and how to accord them reasonable
and impartial-fair-treatment. Even if it demands conclusions
which we do not consider our own, furthermore, it requires us to
think again about the reasonableness of the positions that we do hold,
and about our grounds for dismissing some of the positions we reject.
This is not to claim that those holding views out of line with Golden
Rule reasoning will, on being presented with such reasoning, abandon
their intuitions or change their views; it is certainly worth bearing in
mind the maxim (of unknown provenance, though regularly misattributed to Jonathan Swift) that it is futile to try to reason people out
of positions they were never reasoned into. But it is to claim that
there is good sense in trying to examine the convictions motivating
particular legal decisions, rules, and reform proposals in the light of a
robust principle of fairness such as the Golden Rule, and considering
whether the convictions and the principle lead us to similar conclusions. Moral philosophy, applied to legal problems, has the capacity
to make those who must reflect and decide on those problems (and
352 Lord Reid, The Law and the Reasonable Man, 54 PROC. BRIT. AcAo. 189, 201
(1968).
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those who, eventually, will revisit or study them) question themselves,
pause and think about the legal positions they are minded to take.
Jurisprudence does best when it nags.
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